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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The edges af tha summit still appal 
Whan wa breed an tha dead ar tha beloved; 
Nar aan imaginatian da it all 
In this last plaoa af light; ha dares ta live 
Wha staps being a bird, yat baats his wings 
Against tha immansa immaasurabla amptinass af things. 
- Thaadara Raathka 
Tha history af the concentration camps should raquira no repatitian. 
Yet, recent evidence indicates that in fact the events are baing 
forgotten, and worse, where remembered, they are distorted beyond 
recognition. While it is net within the scope of this paper to re¬ 
construct the tragedy of the Nazi years an understanding of tha bread 
psychological implications for tha survivor is essential. This intro¬ 
ductory overview is also distorting, far by tha vary nature of its 
abstractness it will absaure and dilute tha horrific realities of tha 
camps. But perhaps it is only through this veil of abstraations that wa 
may approximate realities that might otherwise be unapproachable. 
Th® concentration eamps were a moral-historical vacuum. A moral 
vacuum in the sense that all ethical distinctions were suspended 8 
good and evil, humaneness and inhumanity were maided into a total 
negation of personal responsibility. Tha ceneemmitant historical 
vacuum resulted from an abrogation of causality? the relationship 
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between deed and event, actien and consequence was suddenly, and 
without the hint of an end, suspended. 
Threats te the sense of existential well-being were everywhere 
implicit and toe often explicitely executed. Prisoners saw their 
children die, their strivings rendered meaningless, their race on the 
verge of extinction, and the natural world itself, both human and nen- 
human, rapidly disintegrating. On every level the sense ef connectien 
with the ambient and the remembered was severed. In the face ef 
repeated exposure te brutal death, reasonless dying, and the disrup¬ 
tion ef the entire social matrix the concentration camp prisoner felt 
completely abandoned by and closed off from these herited modes by 
which his historical community maintained its psychic integrity. He 
was forced instead te confront all the terrors that connection with 
these communal modes protected him from. 
The singularity ef the experience lies in the distinctive manner 
in which it affects the survivor’s sense ef himself as part ef an 
ordered universe. History records disasters ef greater magnitude, the 
plagues ef the Middle Ages for example, but as natural holocausts their 
origins could always be ascribed te seme Grand Design. The concentration 
camps, however, represented the first time for a man-made violence in 
which no tenable motive could be found. Even prior wars were spoken ef 
as £erusadesK - they either had the rags ef reason or were considered 
to stem from uncivilized heathens® But here fer the first time men who 
were part ef a culture that could hardly be considered barbaric made 
savagery a mode ef being, made brutality a cause fer its own sake® 
Hireshima was seen te beceme the sister image ef tetipetent techno- 
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logical violence, but Hiroshima was vicarious; the pilots never saw 
the people they destroyed. The concentration cam's are unique in that 
they ushered in a technological vialence cenducted an a faca-ta-faca 
level without the psychological distance of the bembadier's telescope. 
Simply, the survivor is thrust into a chaos where net only are the 
landmarks of his existence utterly dislocated but where ary sense of, 
or hope far, ultimate purpose is negated by an all-tee-real vision of 
human bestiality. 
It has always seemed that the saving grace of this graceless 
period was that seme had managed to survive it© Far many, though, it 
appears that even this was no gift. Many survivors had permanent 
physical impairments and many mere found themselves engaged in an 
interminable debilitating struggle with their memories of the camps. 
Rather than being grateful or joyful a large number of concentration 
camp survivors are scarred in such a way that guilt ever surviving is 
their major affective response. They are tortured by self-recrimination* 
for their "failure" to die, and thus for many the sequelae have become 
mere unremitting than the camps themselves. 
The Goethe Oak - under which, legend has it, Goethe wrote seme ef 
his finest poems - steed at the center ef the concentration camp 
Buchenwald. I take this to be the central paradox we must confront 
when evaluating the efficacy ef ary reasoned inquiry, and if throughout 
these pages a dark pessimism seems to emerge it is because ray own 
pest-Helecaust sense is that ef T.W. Adorno who said "No poetry after 
Auschwitz." Despite this, and perhaps simply because I knew ef no ether 
way, I have attempted te understand survivor guilt in the rather faint 
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hop* that reason is the beginning of healing. 
I came to this study with many questions. What is survivor guilt? 
I 
Why does guilt rather than fear or anger appoar as the focus of 
the survivor? Whoro can wo placo this guilt in the continuum between 
the normal and pathological? Does it fit into th* classic psychiatric 
formulations? What ar* its implications for all of us who arc in a 
sense survivors in an ago of unprecedented violence? And the question 
one always dreads to ask for foar of the answer? Is there any relief 
to be found for these bearing this burden *f guilt? 
In an effert tc answer these and ether questions I have traversed 
a rather eircuitous route. The problem turned out te be much different 
than that which I had anticipated. From a beginning invelving classical 
analytic theories *f guilt I found myself becoming more and more 
involvsd with elemental issues bearing #n eur perceived rhythms *f life 
and death. I had the feeling throughout that I was piecing tegether a 
jig-saw puzzle in which each piece was meaningful in itself, and which 
then became even mere significant as it began connecting te the whole. 
The format *f the paper reflects seme ”jig-saw puzzle** aspects ef my 
attempting te delineate a eehesiv* statement from seme very disparate 
theeretieal phrases. 
The paper is divided int# five majer parts. Fellewing this intro¬ 
duction, the secend section deals with the clinical context ef survivor 
guilt, delineating it from the tetal eenstellatien ef symptematelegy 
known as th© survivor syndrome. A third chapter, entitled "Images”, is 
the data ef this work and as such it is the central chapter. It documents 
the ways by whieh the survivor turns historical actuality into a 
distorted but crucial psychological reality with guilt as th# primary 
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component. Various theoretical issues discussed in the psychiatric 
literature bear directly on this imagery and are breught tegether in 
i 
a fourth chapter which provides the matrix for Chapter 5 - "Toward 
a Theory of Survivor Guilt", an effort to presont a unified theory 
by which we may account for the centinued misery that is the legacy 
ef the cencentratien camps* 

CHAPTER II 
SURVIVORS 
.... Neither does the actor suffer 
Nor the patient act. But both are fixed 
In an eternal action, an eternal patience 
Te which all must consent that it may be willed 
And which all must suffer that they may will it 
That the pattern may subsist, for the pattern is the action 
And the suffering, that the wheel may turn and still 
Be forever still. 
~ T.S. Eliet 
Survivor guilt fer clinician and casual observer alike is often 
obscured by a plethora of seemingly mere prefound and pronounced 
symptoms.At once the preblera in examining survivor guilt is te separate 
it from tho encumbrances of its clinical setting and, at the same time, 
to presorve its intogrity within that setting. This admixture of 
symptoms is known as the survivor syndrome and as it often acts, via its 
various component elements, te ebscure the central dilemma ef the 
survivor - that is, guilt - it becomes necessary te clearly delineate 
its borders. 
wThe theme is new, eur nosologic categories are toe incomplete te 
define it.w This remark (translated frem the German) ^ is one ef the 
earliest reactions in the psychiatric literature te the censtellatien 
of symptoms we have come te term the survivor syndrome. As with any 
new diagnostic category there eemeg an array ef names, each reflecting 
6 
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a particular bias en the part of the author. The survivor syndrome 
is n« exception as it has been variously called "Repatriation 
Neurosis," ^ "Chronic Traumatogenic Anxiety Syndrome," 3 
"Persecution Syndrome," ^ and "Concentration Camp Syndrome9" 5 
among others. To indicate ray own emphases I would refer to it as the 
"Cencantratien Camp Survivor Syndrome" to underscore its unique 
qualities as an experience devolving from the concentration eamps and, 
at the same time, emphasize these qualities that are shared with 
survivors of ether disasters. For brevity's sake, however, and with 
the hope that my intentions are evident, I will simply refer to this 
constellation of symptoms as the "survivor syndrome" - discarding 
even the quotation marks. 
The component elements of the survivor syndrome have been examined 
by several groups with the most extensive breakdown having boon made 
by Nathan, Eitinger, and Winnik ^ who list a total of forty-seven 
different elements. Their clinical picture can be considerably 
condensed by noting the prevailing general categories. These are* 
depression, somatization, "affective anesthesia" 7? intense anxiety 
with frequent nightmares, the inability to forget the experience, and 
o 
guilt.0 Generally the syndrome is marked try its chrenicity. 
The depression, referred to by Hoppe as a chronic reactive 
depression 9 9 ±s all-pervasive, characterized by feelings of helpless¬ 
ness-hopelessness, and less of self-esteem whieh seems to be 
closely linked in intensity with the depth of the depressien. ^ 
Interestingly, hewever, suicidal tendencies de net seem te be as 
\ 
8 
frequent in th* depression of th* survivor syndrom* as compared to 
othor typos of depression; th* most rocont evidence indicates, instead, 
an exceedingly low incidences of suicides among concentration camp 
. 12 
survivors • 
Related to the depression is a feeling of emotional coldness-an 
affective anesthesia. This may itself be an expression of depression 
or it may be the reverse, that 
Having lost most if not all, of their early love objects, 
they now fear that to love anyone means to lose them and 
go through the pain all over again. Since they have not 
boon able to work through their losses such a situation 
threatens overwhelming depression.1* 
Rather than an expression of depression it is a means of avoiding the 
depression. It may b* an aspect ef what Lifton has called "psychic 
numbing"1^. Another observer considers it a carry-over of the defensive 
repression of affects that aided survival in the camps.^ Whatever th* 
case may be the depression and affective lameness are th# major factors 
in the devastating social isolation frequently seen in these survivors. 
Somatization of affect was among the earliest noted elements of tho 
survivor syndrome. As early as 1948 Friedman noted the emergence of 
16 psychosomatic complaints. In a more recont study Hoppe found psycho- 
17 1 
somatic complaints in 144 out of 145 survivors studied. ' My own 
\ 
feeling is that there is a large element of "Homines Credunt...." j.n 
his criteria for psychosoma, but even leavening the statistics with 
the proverbial grain ef salt still yields an impressive psyehesematie 
ingredient in the surviver syndrome. A second issue, and a much mer« 
important ono, is whether our labelling the sematic complaints ef 
survivers as "psyche" in origin is realistic, or ar* we using th* 
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term to define away our lack ef knowledge about the physiologic 
effects of massive physical and mental trauma. 
With these objections in mind, however, it is still worth noting 
that the idea of a markedly increased incidence of psychosomatic 
complaints is given credence by (and lends credence to) George Engel’s 
thesis that the state of "helplessness-hopelessness" or "giving up- 
18 
given up"—clearly present in the camps -is the major psychic inducer 
19 
of somatic complaints. There is also the suggestion that these somatic 
ailments may be particularly related to guilt, for as Engel points 
out elsewhere, these are "pain-prone" patients who will frequently 
20 
utilize pain as a means of expiating their guilt. 
The most apparent and well-known element ef the survivor syndrome 
is the intense anxiety state ef the survivor manifesting itself in 
insomnia, nightmares, motor unrest, and fears of renewed persecution 
22 
often culminating in paranoid ideation as well as psychosomatic 
23 
complaints. The nightmares particularly may give us clues to the 
anxiety-provoking memories of the survivor. Trautman notes that the 
nightmares are nearly always characterized by an overwhelming fear of 
existential destruction, utter helplessness and a complete absence of 
24 
counter aggression. The last two elements have also been recognized 
in citizens living under the Nazi regime who had net been in concentra- 
25 
tion camps. The fear ©f existential destruction however, seems to be 
unique to the concentration camp survivor. This is an important 
distinction, for, as Trautman suggests, the background ©f the survivors 
anxiety and its quintessential expression in the nightmare lies in 
his fear of being killed <,^6 This and the observation that fear ef 
death was a frequent complaint among survivors suggests the impertance 
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dream also supports this cententien* survivors with happy dreams abeut 
their dead family members shewed significantly fewer manifostatiens 
which he observed that the incidence ef sleep disturbances was highest 
among groups with the least well-defined, least ritualized, meurning 
29 
processes, and, the reverse, that comforting dreams indicated a 
«?d sleep disturbances among concentration camp survivors may, then 
with the hypertrophied fear ef existential destruction which Trautman 
describes. 
Perhaps the most important feature ef these nightmares is that 
each survivor seems to have a particular image involving a person. 
the first suggestion ef a theme that will be fully developed in this 
work: that there is a residual imagery abstracted from the camp 
experience which becomes the metaphor for the entire event and one’s 
sense ef place within that ©vent. The quotidian recurrence ef parti¬ 
cular themes and images in fully-develeped nen-symbelic ferm (except 
in a synocdechic way) suggests that this imagery may be a majer 
principle behind the muretie manifestations ef the survivor syndrome. 
The undisguised clarity ef these dreams impairs net only the ability 
to find succour in sleep, but to escape frem the waking memeries as well, 
I have saved the guilt cemponent ef the surviver syndreme for 
last because frem this peint ®n the paper will be primarily cencerned 
with the place ef guilt as cempenent and cause ef the surviver syndreme. 
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Almost immediately after the war Friedman noted that among survivors 
he met in the Displaced Persons camps "many often spoke openly of their 
guilt; in others however oven this guilt was repressed or concealed."^ 
Somewhat later as the presence ef guilt among survivors became an 
established fact the nature of the guilt became elucidated# Eitinger 
neted that 
Partly unconsciously, and more often than not without any 
rational foundation of the survivors upbraid themselves for 
not sharing the fate of the others, saying that they have 
betrayed them in this way, that they are indirectly 
accemplices te their death. 
The majority ef cases with feelings ef guilt and self- 
repreach fer lack ef activity prev© te be of a neurotic 
nature, when they are examined mere closely.-^ 
In subsequent case histeries surviver guilt is always phrased in 
terms ef imagined causality and prierity. The very expressiens from 
varieus reports are all variatiens en these themes* 
What right de I have te be happy when my methor and all 
my relatives had te die.36 
If my neighbor gets killed befere I de, I get anether 
chance te live# *' 
Why am I the ene whe survived? Why didn’t I save them? 
Why was I saved myself? 3° 
Why was I net the ene destined te die? 39 
Each questien has in it the thread ef self-repreach and an image ef 
survival fer another’s sacrifice# This is a crucial difference between 
concentration camp survivors and the survivors of Hiroshima whe retain 
a similar residual imagery# Where both have a sens* ef guilt ever 
net having helped th® dead it appears that it is enly the former group 
that can avail itself ef a set ef distinetly articulated, grotesque 
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circumstances which both allows and fosters a perception that the dead 
willfully sacrificed themselves so that others might survive. Chedeff's 
clinical expertence bears this out* 
Feelings of guilt, mentioned spontaneously by seven patients 
and brought out by questioning in others, were related to 
the fact that they had survived the holocaust, while their 
parents, other relatives and friends had been killed... 
sometimes connected to a particular episode when the patient 
felt that different behavior on his part might have saved 
someone's life, but more often such feelings were related 
simply to their having survived when se many had been 
destroyed.**0 
The mest comprehensive bedy ef werk en survivor guilt has been dene 
by William Niederland***, individually and with Henry Krystal.^ The 
cenclusion ef their werk is that guilt stands eut as the single mest 
43 
impertant pathegenetic facter in the surviver syndreme * 
feelings ef guilt and shame are ef the mest prefeund order 
and stand at the bettem ef many ef their clinical manifes¬ 
tations.^* 
The clinical manifestations, in turn, are seen te arise frem twe 
separate, yet intertwined components ef guilt. A depressive component 
gives rise te apathy, withdrawal, seclusien9permanent change ef feelings 
te these ef less, sadness, and depression. A persecutory element engenders 
fear, vigilance, and paraneid reactions.**5 In ether words, the whele 
spectrum ef the survivor syndrome can be generated by guilt© 
It is worthwhile te note here the similarity ef responses seen 
among survivors ©f other extreme situations,* particularly in examining 
♦Throughout this pacer I will be comparing the experiences of the 
concentration camp survivor to two other groups of survivors. The first 
is the general category of hurricanes, floods, mine-cave ins and combat 
which because of their similarities in sequelae I have grouped under 
the heading ef the Extreme Situation. The second group are the survivors 
of Hiroshima, or hibakusha© I have chosen te compare this group separately 
for their sequelae represent a radical departure from these ef previous 
disasters and come closest te the experience ef the camps© 
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the long-term sequela*. The studies ef Archibald and Tuddenham en 
survivers of cembat stress revealed a rather chronic pattern ef 
psychopathology which they named the "Cembat Syndrome." It is 
characterized by intense anxiety, recurrent nightmares, frequent 
hA 
headaches, and increased irritability. If this has a ring ef 
familiarity Ch*doff*s comment will make the connection evident* 
Particularly striking is the marked startle reaction in 
both groups of patients i.e.,soldiers and concentration 
camp survivors which instead of becoming attenuated as 
time passes seems t* get reinforced each time it is activated 
by a new stress stimulus, s* that the organism appears t* 
become more *r less permanently conditioned t* this kind ef 
reaction. As I see it the differences between the concentration 
camp patients and the cembat fatigue group are quantitative 
rather than qualitative.**? 
The major difference between the two groups seems t* be one ef quantity 
rather than quality. Qualitatively there are marked similarities* mere 
than half ef these with the "Cembat Syndrome" had been wounded in battle 
and the group as a whole had witnessed far mere atrocities than a 
control group. Similarly, they are considerably mere guilt-laden 
hQ 
and shew a heightened concern ever harming people.Here tee the 
implication is that death imagery and guilt are interconnected ma jer 
factors. 
In a variety ef different survivor groups Welfenstein ^ and 
ethers ^ have noted elements ef survivor guilt. For the most part, 
however, it was considered relatively rare and inconsequential. The 
important point is that even among these groups in which guilt dees 
net appear in significant fashion, it is most pronounced among these 
who have been closer to, or witnessed, death. The degree ef guilt 
seems t* be directly related t* the extent ef death anxiety felt by 
the survivor. In the case ef the concentration camp survivor his 

14 
guilt appears to be a magnification ef this universal phenomenen 
resulting frem the singular psychehistorical makeup ef the victims 
and the structure ef the camps which played en this makeup. 
This conjunction ef circumstance and psychedynamics preduced in 
the cencentratien camp survivor a complex ef guilt-induced manifestations 
that may emerge in a variety ef forms. It can be seen clinically as a 
form ef pathological mourning 
in which the survivor is stuck in a magnification ef guilt 
which is present in every bereaved person. The ambivalence, 
or mere precisely, the repressed aggression, toward the lest 
object prevents the completion of the work ef mourning* 
Hidden in the self-repreach ... is their repressed rage 
against the new murdered parents who failed to pretect them 
frem the persecution.51 
On the ether hand it may escape clinical detection by being channeled 
into socially condoned or acceptable activities. At ether times this 
all-important guilt maysimply elude the unwary clinical eye. 
Since survivor guilt represents an almost intolerable 
burden it is usually not permitted to enter consciousness, 
remains for the most part repressed, and tends to manifest 
itself clinically in the depressive, persecutory, psycho¬ 
somatic, and neurevegetative symptoms of the patient, or 
very rarely in complete denial.*2 
What we have is akin to an archeological excavation site in which the 
death imagery is buried beneath the later village ef guilt images which 
in turn is cevered by a mere recent city of the survivor syndrome. 
The refractoriness ef the survivor syndrom© may lie in the fact that 
simply te uncover its various levels is a long arduous process 
frequently yielding only fragmentary results* 
In the next section we will excavate the repository ef memories 
that is the survivals legacy by examining the shared imagery retained 
by many as their personal remnant ef the experience. It is this imagery 

which stands at the reet ef surviver guilt, and hence, ef the surviver 
syndreme. 

CHAPTER III 
IMAGES 
We, the rescued. 
From whose hollow bonos death had begun to whittle his flutes 
And on whose sinews he had already stroked his bow - 
Our bodies continue to lament 
With their mutilated music# 
We, the rescued, 
The nooses wound for eur neck still dangle 
Before us in the blue air - 
Hourglasses still fill with eur dripping bleed. 
We, the rescued, 
The worms of fear still feed on us# 
- Nelly Sachs 
The Data 
The data frem which the imagery of the survivor is abstracted 
derives from two sourcest the fictions and memoirs of survivors, and, 
the major source of the material, a series of interviews conducted by 
one David Beder during 19^6 in the Displaced Persons camps of Europe. 
The first source needs no introduction; the second, however, requires 
seme discussion and description of the methodological problems 
associated with its use# 
Dr# David Beder, at that time a psychologist at the Illinois 
Institute of Technology, recorded and subsequently translated, mainly 
frem German, Yiddish, and Polish, seventy interviews with displaced 
persons# The object of these interviews was to leave a rocerd of 
survivor experiences for future researchers and as a valuable object 
in itself# Eight of these interviews initially appeared in a book 
16 
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entitled I Old Not Interview the Dead 53 . tho title emphasizing 
1 
the fact that no record could be complete because the experiences of t 
these who perished could never be known. The full compilation of 
interviews is titled Topical Autobiographies of Displaced People? 
Recorded in Displaced Persons Camps with a_ Psychological and Anthro¬ 
pological Analysis.^ 
There are several problems in using data in which one serves as a 
vicariously vicarious interpreter, at best. The interviews lack, 
outside of what we may make of the words themselves and tho occasional 
editorial note by Boder to indicato crying during the interview, those 
non-verbal indicators of meaning-innuendos of expression and dictien- 
that often change entire meanings. Tho Issue of linguistic distortion 
inherent in any translation must also bo considered. In essence the 
analysis must be incomplete, and, in a sense, inauthentic, for rather 
than examining tho expression (in tho sense of tho total mental operation) 
of the speaker we are confined entirely to tho statement (the meaning 
of the words alene.)55 
In a similar vein are the preblems that arise when using someone 
else*s interviews. In this case I consider these interviews tee have 
been far toe directed, and the direction itself unsatisfactory. The 
emphasis is en what happened rather than on hew one felt about it. 
Though never quite printed this way my frustrated psychological 
predilections often felt that the transcripts road as follows? 
Survivor? I really felt . 
Interviewers Never mind that, let*s get back t© tho facts® 
Despite this emphasis the psychological facts do emerge, and in a rare¬ 
fied form, demonstrating that human description even of the historical 
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events of one*s life is always a psychohistory no matter what the 
interviewer's or interviewee's intentions may be. 
This brings us to the matter of the interviewer's biases. In Boder's 
case they were extraordinarily minimal. Though the title implies some 
interpretive proclivity, the text has little in the way of analysis either 
before or after the interviews. He began the interviews, sitting behind 
his subject, with this prefacet 
We know very little in America about the things that 
happened to you people who were in the concentration 
camps. If you want to help us out, by contributing 
information about the fate of the displaced person, 
tell us your personal story. Tell us what is your 
name, how old you are and where you were and what 
happened when the war started. 
A set of "psychological” documents, in the sense that they wore done by 
a psychologist, without a gross theoretical bias is a rare thing indeed, 
and Boder's decumonts stand eut in that they seem to have been done 
with no polemic intention. By being this kind of undisterted document 
it provides an opportunity for a certain methodological purity in which 
the interpreter's bias has nething to do with the shape ef the 
interview. Te my mind this was an extraerdinary aspect ef these 
interviews, for within their framework the pessibilities ef a disciplined 
subjectivity in interpretation was much enhanced. 
Whatever cavils I have made aside, the importance ef these 
interviews is that they represent an aspect ef a total psychehistorical 
experience which is accessible, detatchable from the whole, and, hence, 
subject to scrutiny. As what fellows will, I believe, reveal, there 
was much in this scrutiny. 
I 
19 
Survivor Guilt and th* Imagination of Contingency 
The survivor syndrome appears to be connected with shared residual 
imagery of death; and the ruilt manifest as part of this syndrom* sooms 
particularly related to this imagery. The origins of the guilt, 
however, do not lie in th* neurotic expression of the syndrom* but 
instead are found most clearly in a less well-defined nexus where 
the relationship of man’s egocentricity and th* fact of death is 
realized—th* sphere *f existential guilt. There the emphasis is on 
the moral relatedness of man and his universo, and as such it provides 
an important perspective from which t* view a sense of guilt that 
surely has its historical roots in a less of connectedness. It 
seems to me that certain aspects of th* concentration camp survivor 
guilt can better be understood from this standpoint of ontic or 
existential guilt rather than from psychoanalytic epigenetics. 
Ontological guilt has three components* 
1. Denial of, and failure to fulfill, one’s potentialities; a guilt 
involving the eigenwelt *r one’s "own world.” 
2. The inability t* understand another; this guilt is central t* eur 
existence and is part *f the mitwelt-th* world *f eur contemporaneous 
human community. 
3. Separation from, and less of connection with, the world of nature; 
this involves not only th* Umwelt-the surrounding world,-but th# 
Eigenwelt and Mitwelt as well.^ 
The important point is that all #f us share in this guilt. Where 
neurotic guilt has th# possibility, however small, that beyond th* 
formation ef a matrix it can be avoided, avoidance #f entelegic 
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guilt is by definition an impossibility* Whore neurotic guilt has its 
source in the remembrance er expectation of a lex talionls ontological 
guilt has its psychohisterical roots in nothing but the existential 
condition itself* Essentially ontic guilt is provoked by fear of 
dying in an unfulfilled manner which engenders a sense of absolutely 
lost connection within the framework of human continuity. Unfaced 
ontic guilt may produce neurotic guilt, which serves to impair the 
sense of interpersonal awareness and commitment requisite for feeling 
existential guilt. ^8 This suggests a mode by which survivor guilt 
may be adaptive. The neurotic guilt can serve to help the survivor 
avoid confronting the cere of his dilemma: the less of existential 
continuity. It is considerably less painful to experience neurotic 
guilt than to face the tensions of an entelegically-roeted death imagery, 
less of symbolic immortality and a severed sense of connectedness. In 
this way neurotic guilt may be an extension of a "closing-off process^ 
which impairs real efforts toward formulation. 
The concept of an ontic guilt derivative of man's relatedness 
to his existential condition is corroborated by the anthropological 
studies of Robert Redfield.According to him the primitive bears a 
"greater burden of guilt than civilized man, for he feels morally 
fa 
related to the entire universe as well as to his group."DJL Although 
Redfield dees net make the distinction it is clear that the guilt to 
which he refers is entelegic. Redfield*s supposition, however, Is in 
contradistinction to Freud's dicta that with increased civilization 
there is increased guilt.^ It is in the resolution of these seemingly 
contradictory hypotheses that the distinction between ontic and 
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neurotic guilt becomes evident. In terms of a conscious sens# #f 
guilt, the kind Redfield refers t*, entelogic guilt contingent upon a 
sense #f doatn-defying continuity with the universe is an atavism. 
Neurotic guilt has become the greater burden of the modern because 
the less of eur natural connection has submerged the conscious 
sense of relatedness to the universe that we term "primitive," and 
provoked, in a far mere intense fashion, eur fears of death. The 
dilemma was clearly adumbrated by Wordsworth I 
The world is tee much with us, late and seen 
Getting and sponding we lay waste eur powers I 
Little we see in nature that is ours 
We have given eur hearts away, a sordid been. 
The point is this: the kind of guilt we consciously feel has changed* 
although both forms are still presont in varying degrees in each of 
us; it is the distribution of their expression which has altered. 
The concentration camp survivor, however, bears the full burden ef 
both forms of guilt. Survival in the camps necessitated a regression 
to a mere primitive state and the encounter with death that accompanied 
this regression placed the survivor in closer touch with the elemental 
death-immortality imagery that is at the cere of the primitivevs 
oxistential universe. The experience ef the survivor places him in 
a position ef increased contiguity with his entelegic guilt, for 
as primitive, in this sense, he is faced with a greater feeling ef 
moral relationship to a feared univorse. At the same time, however, 
the survivor also bears the guilt ef modern eivilizatien. Ho bears 
the burden ef Freud*s "civilized** neurotic guilt by virtue ef the fact 
that he is psychologically conditioned by his experience as a modern 
who needs to suppress his eneeunter with images ef the primitive 
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and the absurd. The survivor’s confrontation with the primitive-beth 
in reality and symbolically-may reinforce and exacerbate a heretofore 
latent ontolegic enilt, but his psychehisterically determined 
modernism, with particular consideration for his ambivalent feelings 
surrounding his role in the greatest of modern immoralities, has 
given him an even greater share of the neurotic guilt indigenous to 
the modern condition. 
From this vantage we can perceive the residual imagery of the 
concentration camp survivor as multiplex in nature. At its base 
level it is a memento mori. a singularly intense reminder of our 
mortality. The existential terror engendered by this imagery in turn 
gives rise te feelings of guilt as the mode by which one removes his 
concerns from death; guilt is able te effect this remeval by several 
means. 
To feel guilty is a way ef feeling control, even in distant 
retrospect, over events. Eriksen sneaks ef existential guilt as inexpli¬ 
cable when he refers te it as the "tendency on man’s part te feel 
that he has caused the face te turn away which happened te turn 
elsewhere. *63 To seme extent the maneuvers ef the survivor may give seme 
explanation. When a sense ef centre! ever events is lest the 
essential fear evoked is that ef death which represents the absolute 
less ef our ability to control. By imagining oneself to have caused 
our misfortunes we place them within the realm ef punishment, and this 
gives the sense that we have caused that which we received (by a 
perfectly circular reasoning) thus mitigating eur fears by reaffirming 
eur causal role. The mythic paradigm is the expulsion from the Garden 
I 
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of Eden; it is on® of our earliest efforts to account for tho fact that 
we must die and it is made within the context of man’s complicity 
in his fate. For tho survivor as well to be guilty is to be in 
control, and to be in control is to remain connected to tho possibility 
of immortality. This may serve to explain another of the differences 
between concentration camp survivors and survivors of other extreme 
situations. In the latter group there is often a feeling that an 
element of luck was involved in their survival; concentration camp 
survivors do not, for the most part, share this feeling, fer luck 
implies a sense of happiness over the outcome and, mere importantly, 
a loss of control over the possibilities fer survival. As Eugen Kegen 
put it: "Chance? Yes - but enly insefar as *luck* is a cempenont ef 
persenal ability." ^ The cencentration camp survivor fools he has 
made his own luck. Thus he attempts te deny any element ef happiness 
ever the outcome and refuses te absolve himself from a self-imposed 
liability fer all events that ecurred - including the death ef his 
comrades. In essence he assumes an omnipotence fer every aspect ef 
the event thus assuring his guilt fer the outcome. 
Quilt also serves as a primitive way ef affirming life. The 
concentration camp survivor has considerable difficulty in giving 
free rein te his emotions, fer in doing so he runs the risk of being 
overwhelmed since the crux ef his most important memories revolve 
around images of death. Thus fer a survivor in a self-imposed state 
ef affective anesthesia to feel guilty is one ef the few avenues ef 
feeling that is available. Even if they are excruciatingly painful 
they affirm life by being feelings nonetheless. Quilt further removes 
death by being a form ef emotive life itself. 
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Perhaps the most important aspect in all of this is tho ovent 
itself; the psychohisterical actuality ef the concentratien camps 
not only lends itself to, but foments, a highly charged guilt imagery. 
The dehumanization process was so complete as to blur the distinction 
between victim and viotimizer, almost forcing the victim to perceive 
himself as accomplice to the event. This blurred distance between 
assailant and victim inherent in the residual imagery ef the camp exper 
ience allows the survivor to further distort the relationship between 
guilt and innocence, motive and result, and to create, by a convoluted 
logic, an imagination ef contingency. The survivor assumes a ene-te-ene 
organic relationship between the lives ef individuals in the camps 
so that every survival is balanced by a death. A connection between 
the individual and the fate ef the cemmunity-at-large is also made! 
communal destruction is also seen as a consequence ef individual action 
The most patently explicit ef this complex ef images in which 
death is subsumed by an imagination ef contingency concerns itself 
with "guilt over survival priority." Here the perceived causal 
connection between one’s own survival and the resultant death ef a 
comrade is made clear. The novelist Jorge Semprun articulates the 
beginnings ef the process* 
It wouldn’t take much for me to find myself suspect. It 
wouldn’t take much for me to tell him its net my fault. 
It wouldn’t take much for me to start apologizing for having 
survived. 
But maybe its £gue, maybe I’m the one who left him, who 
abandoned him. 
The death imagery that causes this suspicion to become an outright 
accusation is to be found in the frequently made connection between 
memories ef one's own survival and memories ef ether's deaths* 
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I was beginning to weaken. And my friend with whom I had 
been together all the time, all these years...was telling 
me...You have to hold out, you have stood it so long. Keep 
your strength. And meanwhile everyday my best friends wore 
dying. My buddies nerished. ' 
About the others where they were led no one know. Only the 
next day we saw the huge flames and the smoke from the 
crematory where they wore being burned. And wo went into 
the barracks.68 
Hannah Bluhm, in her examination of the survivor autobiographies, 
has said that for the investigator "death in a Nazi concentration camp 
requires no explanation. Survival does."69 The issue is no less problem¬ 
atic for the survivor who, in the face of the sheer statistical odds 
against survival, must determine hew he did it. 
I don't know how ^survived, that is hard to conceive hew 
people were saved.' 
One who survived his wife, child, and brother is asked how he managed 
to stay healthy enough to withstand the physical trauma of the camps. 
He repliesl 
I really don't knew. My brother who died he was possibly 
of even better health than I.?l 
In this reply lies the dilemma ef many survivors* if expected criteria 
for survival were ef no value, by what measure ef "luck" did they 
survive? The quest for rational explanations remains elusive. 
I don't know today, myself, how the epidemic of spotted 
typhus had spared us, because around our barracks... 
there were barracks with spotted typhus.?2 
The question of the unnaturalness of the deaths is also part of 
the survivor's difficulty. These words, by a young survivor who before 
being interned in the concentration camps was a member ef the French 
underground, make this added dilemma clear* 
♦ 
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I often wonder why I got out an-* why they remained there. 
But one should not talk, it dees not help. Everyone 
understands what it does to a persons heart te lose his 
parents in such tragic times, because we knew when a person 
dies his own death, nothing can be dene. That is a matter 
of nature. But when one knows that the parents have gene 
into gas that is very hard; it is very hard te bear such 
a thought. 
There are major issues in the plight of the surviver implicit here. 
Survival prierity is clearly breught up* why did _! survive when the 
others died? The inability to oxplain the deaths rationally is also 
an issue? whan one cannot speak of it, it is because it defies reason 
or logical comprehension. This is related to what the survivor feels 
is the absolute inriescribability of the experience? 
74 
Impossible, to make a picture of it...Words are of no avail. 
To tell that is the hardest thing for us. Why? Because there 
are no words. No way of expressing it that can describe 
what happonod from the day when we disembarked frem the 
train in the lager Auschwitz.75 
When tho experience transcends the realm ef the describable it enters 
the domain of tho irrational or a-ratienal. This stems frem a sense ef 
inappropriate or mutant death which is not "a matter of nature" and whieh 
is impossible t® apprehend and rationalize. 
This issue cemes back te the central difficulty ef the survivor, 
that of trying to place tho concentration eamps within a framework of 
reason? Why did I survive? 
Why did I not go together with them? Why did I remain alive?^ 
Te be unable te answer this question means that the surviver risks 
an inevitably self-destructive confrontation with the imagery ef absurd 
perforce cheese an alternative imagery. He can begin te find blame 
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within himsrlf simply in the fact that ta survive in the perversa 
landscape af the cancentration camps was an anamalaus farm af 
existenca. Survivors are an overwhelming mindrity and, as with all 
minerities, they are treubled by thdir being different and nagged by 
the daubt that parhaps thay did da semathing wrong not to have gone 
the way of tha many. The value af survival itself must ba censideredi 
I was lucky - I say "luckyM because now I have theught it 
all over and I see that it has lad, that it was ta tha 
goad...'' 
Evan if tha answer is in tha affirmative tha surviver still wanders 
whether in order ta survive ha did semething wrong, ar endured what 
humane beings should not. Tha ability ta clasa aff tha envirenment, 
ta engage in a psychic numbing, is questioned by tha surviver an 
ethical grounds* 
... sa thay piled peapla in mounds and peured gas aver them 
and burned them over open pyres. One gat accustamed ta such 
a sight as if it were semething erdinary. It is terrible ta 
say that. And to this day I can’t cancaiva haw I was able ta 
bear this stench which weuld not only coma thraugh tha nasa 
but would stick ta ane’s palate as if it ware something 
palpable; this repugnant pestilential stench that filled 
the air. 78 
Tha envirenment was an inhuman ana and these who returned fram it 
are viewed with suspician. And where survivors are viewed with suspicien 
tha dead are seen as dying because af a higher ethical sensibility 
that would not sustain living in such conditions. Tha survivers 
may be the lucky ones, but the dead are tha virtuaus. 
... the lucky ones; for instance I, remained alive. 
Tha strangest, tha mast beautiful have died.79 
Viktar Frankl, tha existential psychiatrist (ar Legetherapist as ha 
more accurately terms it) wha survived feur different cancantratian 
camps, has a similar percept!anI 
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there wag a sort of self-selecting process going on the 
whole time among all of the priseners. On the average, 
only those prisoners could keep alive who, after years ef 
trekking from camp te camp, had lost all scruples in their 
fight for existence; they wore prepared te use every means, 
honest or otherwise, even brutal force, theft and betrayal 
of their friends, in order to save themselves. We who have 
come back, by the aid ef many lucky chances or miracles - 
whatever one may choose te call them - we knew! the best ef 
us did net return. 0 
One ef the most dispassionate ef the concentration camp reporters, 
Eugen Kegon, similarly apotheosizes the dead at the expense ef the 
livings 
There were many dead martyrs in the camps but few 
living saints. 
With a progression from imagery ef absurd death that is recollected 
in concert with one's own survival te the perception ef the survivor’s 
moral inferiority the step te an imagination ef contingency is a short 
one. If the good and the beautiful died there- in complete perversion 
ef eur sense of justice - there must have been seme way in which we 
contributed te their downfall. Where Frankl and Kegon are quite explicit 
in this thought for ether survivors it becomes an implicit matter ef 
faith. The following descriptions ef two similar episodes give us 
clues te this kind ef psychology: 
A let ef women fell into the water and we ... net knowing 
it, would kill the drowning ones with eur own feet because 
©no was running ever the ether.”2 
The second survivor’s description gees a step further in self-blame* 
f 
She remembers being forced into a barn with several thousand ether 
priseners. 
When we came out in the morning many comrades remained 
behind. 
What dees it mean "remained behind?" 
We ourselves have trampled them te death. With only., with 
eur own feet we have trampled eur brothers te death, 
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The sense ef responsibility is present in beth esses; it becemes 
unmitigated, however, in the second. There is a sense in the secend 
passage ef the victim beceming victimizer which, theugh present in 
tho first, is a goed deal mere muted. In a letter received by a 
surviver from a friend whe worked in the crematoria this self-blame 
assumes grotesque proportions: 
I am already transformed into an animal. I have already 
gassed my mother. I have already gassed my father; I have 
already gassed my sisters and my brethers and the whele 
people; the whele Jewish peeple. 
Accident and circumstance are rendered irrelevant as the victim 
places himself in the rele ef killer. 
Frem this pure implication ef self in the death ef others stems 
a mere subtle and psychelegically mere useful imaginatien ef ene-te- 
ene causality. Jerge Semprun distills the essence ef it: 
Each returning de£ertee whe isn’t his sen reduced the 
chance that his sen survived, that he’ll see him return 
alive. My ewn life, having already returned, increases the 
pessibility ef his sen’s death. ®5 
The surviver is ne lenger a murderer by any physical actien as was 
the case in the preceeding passages. Instead he is a murderer by his 
mere intentien te survive. Since there are relatively few survivers whe 
might actually feel they murdered the dead in an act ef physical 
vielence, it is simply mere tenable te imagine the dead as dying 
"in lieu ef" the living, which can still be censidered a causal 
relatienship, but is net as self-destructive as "because ef*.’ The 
meraery is that ene’s life became a function ef anether prisener’s 
fate: 
Every prisener was dependent en his fellew priseners, 
utterly at their mercy* 86 
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Another survivor remembers an SS man speaking te him immediately 
after this same man had shet his clesest friend. He venders 
how its possible that a man, a human being can be ne mere 
conscious... of having killed semebedy and speaking te some¬ 
body who was only a chance that its not he^ who has boon 
killed, like his comrade. 
The question of survival priority is a profoundly personalized one* 
Why did he_ die instead of me? As "Credo quia absurdum ost" is untenable 
for the survivor who has little support for this kind of transcendental 
stance, ho must choose a belief in causality, and that which is most 
readily available in his residual imagery appears to bo this imagination 
of contingency. The possibilities for assuming this causal role are 
expressed by a survivor who had been hiding in an underground bunker 
during a deportation raid. Ho had the opportunity to save some other# 
being hunted and hero ho explains how ho would have felt had ho not 
opened his bunker to a family outside who wore looking for a place 
to hide: 
I tore open the cover of the bunker. I said to myself, 
I den*t want to save myself and have on my conscience six, 
six burned offerings - Hungarian Jews. 
Had ho not saved thorn it would have boon his fault; ho sees their 
lives as contingent upon his action. The expression burnt offering is 
noteworthy in this regard. It will be discussed at greater length with 
the imagery of women and children, but suffice it to say hero that it 
is the language of sacrifice and it implies that the dead would have 
been sacrificed for the sake of the survivor. 
The ultimate guilt imago is that of one being killed or taken 
away in lieu of another 8 
From the start people wore under the impression that they 
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will look only for men. They would hide and leave the women 
and children... Yes they would hide and leave at heme the 
children and wives. So they took the women and children. ®9 
There are refinements on this perception as well. The apotheosis of 
the dead leads to the belief that they willfully surrendered thomsolvos 
to the system, and by this act saved the others. 
... seeing that there was no way of saving oneself 
people simply surrendered so that death may come sooner 
because to live in such a manner was worse than death. u 
Many have also sought death. They ceuldn’t look at that 
and endure all the ways in which we were tortured. 91 
The dead rather than remembered as the weaker for being unable to 
sustain the brutality are the stronger in terms of their heightened 
sensitivity to inhumanity. 
Just as the dead sacrificed themselves, so the living are seen, 
in some way, as abandoning the dead. A survivor, who we might note 
was already pregnant ten months after liberation, recalls vividly her 
attempt te save a child from the gas chamber. The SS man whem she asks 
te spare the child te Lis her 
If you want to go to tho crematory you can go with the child* 
And if not go away from the child. I could accomplish nothing 
.... I cried very much... And I parted from the child and left.92 
This same woman remembers that 
The struggle fer life was strenger than anything. I left 
my brother on the road. I do not knew what happened te 
his bones. 93 
In both memories there is a sense of abandoning the dead In order te 
improve one’s own chance for survival. It is noteworthy that in the 
secend passage she makes no real mention of the fact that her brether 
was already dead when she left his bedy at the roadside. The sense ef 
sacrificing one life fer another is present in both passages - even 
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if the sacrifice is viewed as a realistically useless gesture as in 
the first passage er benign abandemient as in the secend. With the 
sense of benign abandonment there is eften a sense ef failed comrade¬ 
ship in which it is felt that a mere forceful act might have saved the 
dead. Where abandonment is usually by pure passivity failed comradeship 
is felt to involve seme constructive action, but net enough to be 
meaningful. 
There we had to abandon two of eur comrades who were weak® 
We wanted to take them with us ... but they said these 
people will come in the automobiles. And so they are •'coming'® 
to this very day. 9^ 
The survivor's feeling is that seme small measure of protest er 
protection for the weak would have been enough to save them, but even 
this small measure could net be attained, and their impotence leads 
them to a further sense ef fault, ef guilt. 
All ef these variations on the theme ef contingency strengthen 
the feeling ef guilt. One is guilty net only by his inaction, but by 
a sense ef ethical inferiority and a debt ef gratitude which can never 
be repayed. (And as we knew unpaid debts are a prime source ef hate.) 
These elements, beginning with the basic fear ef death and the 
existential need to feel a sense ef mastery ever one's fate as well 
as to explain one's anomalous survival in an environment that defied 
descriptien, impel the survivor to find seme equatien whereby the 
calculus ef his existence can be defined. The disterted relationships 
between assailant and victim inherent in this system which forced its 
victims to become psychological accomplices - by their desire to 
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survive - reinforces the survivor's effort to establish a dynamic 
equilibrium in which every change on the side of survival is balanced 
by an equal change on the side of death. 
Much of the imagery te fellow is concerned with issues of survival 
priority and are themselves, though frequently significant divergences, 
variations, nonetheless on a theme of ene-fer-ene contingency. The 
artificial distinctions I have made between varying aspects of this 
theme have been created fer the sake ef the clarity gained in examining 
the individual components ef this admixture. 
The pure imagery ef survivor guilt and the alleys that fellew 
provide a principle by which the survivor attempts te master the 
imagery ef death. But we ought te bear in mind, as the manifestations 
ef the survivor syndrome attest and as Elio Wiosel, a survivor ef 
Ausehvitz and Buchenwald, articulates: 
Te defeat death, te defeat it by accident, against one's 
wish, is neither victory nor blessing. 
Selections 
The "selections” were precisely that which they were called: 
roll-calls ef the prisoners during which the decisions ef who would 
live and who would die were made. It was common knowledge among the 
prisoners that they were divided into three groups: these able te 
work - they livedj cases of questionable work value - their survival 
depended on the priorities ef that particular time, whether extermination 
or slave labor was deemed mere important; finally, the eld and the 
young - they were considered ef no value and were sent te the gas 
* 
chambers immediately. Selectiens began upen arrival in the camps, and 
the prisoners were already aware ef their significance. 
We were fortunate te be assigned te the left side and 
it was said that w© are still going te the lager, there 
is hope fer us te live. 96 
The SS man stood there eating candy bonbons. And with the 
bonbon in his mouth, he pointed, this one te the right, 
this one te the left. And what that meant - we knew already.9? 
Those who might net have realized what was happening found out very 
early, very explicitely. This young survivor remembers the announcement 
ef an SS officer immediately before the selection began* 
Continuing throughout the operation ef the camps the frequency ef 
the selections varied with the changing priorities. The memories ef them 
are filled with images ef death and guilt. Fears ef death were apparent. 
Prisoners know that te be sent te the wrong side meant an irrevocable 
death sentence, thus many ef their images ef death are pictured in 
terms ef which side one was selected fer. 
There burned a huge fire. This was the fire ef these who 
had te go te the right. 99 
This memory is a retrospective one both visually and spatially; the 
psychological distance between symbol and meaning is what is remembered. 
ether survivors recall their prospective fears waiting fer themselves 
or their families te be picked fer the gas chambers. 
And sure enough the mother was immediately assigned te 
group three which meant the worst. 
Whether one remembers being psychologically near or distant the image 
is the same - fear ef death, often accompanied by a sense ef absolute 
impotence evoked by the inability te de something that might alter the 
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outcome of the selection. 
... it was known that Saturday... Sunday morning he will 
bo sent to the gas chamber but unfortunately I could net 
find a way, I could do no more than weeping or wailing. I 
had to look on not only when my brother, but all my friends, 
all my comrades, relatives, female ceusins, male cousins, te 
look on, how they wore sent away there and then. 
Not only are the death images fear-engendering, but the feeling ef 
impotence further serves te evoke fears of dying by forcing the survivor 
te come te grips with his inability te control his own life and death* 
Again the survivor makes his painful choice. Rather than focus 
on this imagery and its implications he attempts te recall ether 
apects ef the selections which provide images that in seme way will 
alleviate the sense ef existential pewerlessness and hence, the fear 
ef dying. But we are existentially powerless and the concentration camp 
survivor knows this better than anyone, so what he needs is an imagery 
that will help him avoid being reminded ef the fact. He can find these 
particularly easily in memories ef the selections because they contain 
olements ef contingency in a palpable form. As with survival priority, 
by assuming a sense ef guilt he give himself an artifice ef power 
enabling him to forget the impotence and death fear that is inherent 
in the actual circumstances of the selections. The system ef the 
selections,however, also provides the alternate imagery. The SS 
occasionally gave prisoners wcentrelM ever killing their comrades. In 
one camp a prisoner was called upon te select twenty-five people for 
the gas chamber. If he refused the SS would send seventy-five ef their 
choice instead. The dilemma is well-remembered8 
The prisoner, he could save the lives ef seventy-five 
people. By doing this selection. &it he would be the 
murderer ef twenty-five. 1 ^ 
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Simon Wiesenthal , in his memoir The Murderers Among Us, recounts a 
similar story: 
I once talkod with a Jewish concentration camp trusty who 
saved his life by taking part in the execution of a follow 
Jew* The devilish SS man told him it was either ho or the 
other man. 103 
The survivor*s sons© of one life traded for another, then, can havo 
its origins in a real event, though fer most survivors the part they 
played in this reality was little other than receiver of a story or, 
closer to the event, a helploss witness. Yet they feel that they tee, 
though in exceedingly mere subtle ways, willed the destruction of the 
ether. Their guilt feelings about their thoughts are as harsh as the 
criticism of deeds. Wiesenthal continues: 
The trusty’s defense was that if he hadn't done it somebody 
else might havo shot the Jew, and he would have died tee. I 
don't accept this: murder is murder ne matter who commits 
it. 104 
There is ne way out fer this survivor who in an exaggerated fashion 
symbolizes the plight of all survivors. Thought becomes equated with 
action, and to have wished the death of another » as inevitably happ¬ 
ened in this situation - is felt as being the equivalent of having 
collaborated in that ether's death. One also feels guilty ever having 
wished the death of another, and, as Bettelheim points out, this is 
a major focus fer guilt feelings. 
The argument that the biological urge fer survival precluded 
moral responsibility is unacceptable, fer the survivor feels that any 
ethical lapse is inexcusable. This is particularly s® when the dead 
are remembered as sacrifices fer their survival. The following excerpt 
exemplifies this memory of ene-fer-ene balance inherent in the selections 8 

37 
I pleaded with him that he should set the little boy free 
that he wasn’t yet fourteen years old only thirteen... Ho 
is still a child... But the doctor said: Sine* I have set 
one free, I cannot set free the other. And wo had to agree.^05 
A case history reported by Ruth Jaffe demonstrates dissociative phenom¬ 
ena having their origin in the guilt imagery of the selections. I quote 
from her report: 
Katy was twenty-four years old when the war broke out. 
During psychiatric examination she suddenly turned her 
head, rose, bowed, made searching movements with her head, 
covered her eyes with her hand, as if to see better into the 
distance, talked to herself, and burst into laughter which 
resembled crying... After some minutes she regained composure 
and related that she had heard her sister’s voice. Exploration 
in narcoanalysis revealed that this pantomimic scene is an 
almost exact repetition of a traumatic situation which sho 
had gone through at her arrival at the railway station of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. She had arrived there with her 
eight-year eld sen and her yeunger sister who was the boy's 
maid. After the journey of several days she had got out 
exhausted and dazed. When recovering after the first minutes 
of perplexity and confusion sho saw two columns ®f people 
leaving the station in different directions, one consisting 
of the eld and ef mothers with children, and the other ono 
of young men and wemen. She understood from previous ex¬ 
periences that this was a "selection” and that the first 
column was destined for death. Suddenly she realized that 
already at a distance her sen and her sister walked in this 
column. Before she could run after them and take her sister's 
place in order to save her, she was kicked into the second 
column of those selected for work. She could hear her sister 
calling "Katy where are you? Why do you leave me?" 106 
Jaffe sees her attacks as repetitions of this scene, and notes the 
profound sense ef sacrifice in the memory ef it. 
She is obsessed by guilt at having sacrificed her sister 
in order to stay alive and vainly tries to cenvinc© her- 
solf that she was not capable in her confusion ef orienting 
herself mere quickly. 10/ 
The recollection of the selections seem t® provide two alternative images. 
The fear ef death, however, is no real choice. What the survivor dees 
is te pick up the subtile threads ef an imaginary guilt and weave them 
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into a curtain of guilt which shields him from far moro dangerous 
fears. 
Resistance and Blurred Complicity 
The issue ef resistance is a highly volatile one, but the question 
ef why the prisoners did er did net resist cannot be taken up here. It 
enters into the subject ef survivor guilt only insofar as the question 
plagues many ef the survivors and the imagery connected to it is 
another from which guilt stems. 
One ef the best examples ef the potency of this residual imagery 
came in the mid-Sixties with the publication ef Hannah Arendt*s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. Essentially the book was concerned with what the 
subtitle termed "the banality ef evil” , and the failure of the Israeli 
courts to transcend, what Miss Arendt considered, parochial matters and 
establish a universal definition ef, and approach to, "erimes against 
\ 
humanity." In making her arguments to this effect Arendt gratuitously 
stated ( the point was net particularly relevant to the thrust ef the 
book ) that 
...this role ef Jewish leaders in the destruction ef their 
own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter in the whole 
dark stery. ^®8 
Stemming in large part frem this sentence a heated and often virulent 
debate ensued in the intellectual and scholarly communities. The 
rather vituperative nature ef many ef the arguments indicated mere, 
I think, than mere intellectual gymnastics er pure scholarly polemics. 
The issue was a sensitive one for many survivors prior to this 
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debate. Almest immediately after their liberatien they were plagued 
with questions ef why they did net resist. In speaking ef members ef 
the French resistance, the Maquis, this surviver indicates her sensit¬ 
ivity te the matter: 
I emphasize sixty Jewish women, sixty Jewish girls because 
it is being said that the Jews have werked fer the GermanSo 
It is being said that the Jews were hiding and that the 
Jews did nething. HO 
With this emphasis en these whe actively resisted are implicit 
accusatiens against these whe did net; the fellewing passage has this 
mere openly: 
Among this group whe were fighting, whe took chancos with 
their lives, were significantly less casualties than among 
the Jews whe were hiding or were sitting with their hands 
crossed waiting te be arrested. HI 
The accusation comes te this: by failure te resist one becomes, in effect, 
an accomplice te his own and his comrade*s destruction. That this may 
be true is a possibility that nags at the surviver each time he remem¬ 
bers an event in which he felt particularly powerless. And the memories 
ef his impotence which connect with the deaths ef his friends evoke fan¬ 
tasies that perhaps things might have been otherwise had he acted. 
The failure te resist was recognized as a way ef clinging te 
survival, yet, paradoxically, it meant an almest sure death net te; 
and it meant death te act as well. The imagery ef death-if-yeu-de 
or if-yeu-den*t that is connected with issues ef resistance may explain 
the vacillation between defensiveness concerning the inability te resist 
and the exultation when speaking ef these whe did. This excerpt is 
fairly typicals 
Once the Christian block trusty reproached me: "Why are 
they going with such indifference te death? Why don't they 
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fight? Why don't they kill somebody?” So I replied ”You 
haven't been in a ghotte. You have not seen how Jews went 
away in transports with congealed nerves. A human being 
can cry himself dry; a human being clings to life and up 
to the last moment there is a ray of hop* and they are 
defensoloss. And they have no arms... And th# same day a 
miracle happened. The Jews siezed the oven... And I thought 
then maybe we shall still survive. 
Resistance for most meant death; yet as a meaningful death it was 
preferable : 
I in part assisted in this revolt in Auschwitz which was 
for all of us a satisfaction to know that if w® shall have 
to die, we will know, that as far as it was possible for us 
we have obstructed the werk of extermination. 
What this survivor is saying stands as an accusation which those who did 
not resist have te centend with: for seme ef us the ethical impulse 
superceded the biological urge to survive.The pride with which steries 
of resistance are told, even, as in the following case, where the form 
ef rebellion was suicide, are in marked contrast te the shame felt by 
mest survivers fer their failure te act. A girl abeut te be hanged is 
remembered with particular esteems 
... she was cutting up her arteries because she did not 
want to go to her death... by their hands, but that she 
wanted te die her own death. 
These whe did net resist, then, cannet even call their deaths their 
ewn. Survival is held specieus because of the survivor8s failure to 
avail himself of the possibility ef a noble death. And the dead wh# died 
witheut resisting are also tainted with this mark of impurity. 
With these harshly ambivalent memories of death and the dead 
inherent in the images ef resistance ceme questions ef fault. By net 
having resisted one becemes, effectively, part accomplice. There is ne 
neutral pesitien: ene is either rebel er eellaberater in a blurred 
visien which perceives enly distant ends ef the spectrum. Theugh there 
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were actual collaborators who are blamed the surviver sees himself as 
having gone aleng with them - whether wittingly er unwittingly dees net 
matter. 
...account of Menok Merin and his crew. He lulled us inte 
such a state of sleep we didn’t think, we didn’t consider 
the possibility of resistance. H5 
The surviver psychologically transforms his passivity inte a perception 
of collaboration by default. The feeling that n I tee might have 
resisted” has its obverse in ** I tee might have been an accomplice.*8 
I put myself inte his situation. I imagine what would 
I have done if I had been in his place? ... Today one 
can say if one does net want to be truthful * Yes, I defi¬ 
nitely would have refused.* But one can never be sure that 
if it would come to it, that one would simply have replied 
8 I don’t want to do it.8 Because a human being is only a 
human being. 
Since the memory of non-resistance most frequently revolves around 
memories of ether's deaths and, hence, one’s fears of dying, the sur¬ 
viver cannot afford to view the image objectively. Rather he distorts 
the perception of himself in the event and the event as a whole, 
eliminating any mitigating circumstances. The very valid reasons why 
he may have been unable to resist er why, as it was in most cases, it 
may have been utterly futile to have dene so, are conveniently dispensed 
with as the surviver becomes plagued with the thought that he might 
have dene mere te save himself and his fellew-prisoners. Instead of 
remembering his real impotence and fears of being killed when the imagery 
of resistance is reawakened he perceives it as a guilt-laden challenge. 
A seng emerging frem the concentration camps , Es Brent ( It &irns)p 
centains this challenge: 
If your life is dear te you. 
Take the buckets and quench the fire. 
■r 
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Quench it with your own bleed1 
Provo that you can do it. 
Don’t stand brothers looking on 
With folded armsl 
Take the buckets and put out the fire 
Because our village burns 1 
The perception is that these who did net resist steed "looking on with 
folded arms" when they had the opportunity to do something. The sur¬ 
vivor confronts himself with this blurred vision of complicity for 
ho intuits it far safer to fool guilty than to be paralyzed by fear. 
Shared Terror 
To this point wo have spoken of an imagery of lives in organic 
continuity purely on an individual-te-individual basis. There is, 
however, another form of this imagination of contingency that is part 
of the psychic residuum of the survivor. I refer to a sense of communal 
interdependence in which the surviver perceives his actiens as having 
an effect not only on individuals but on the fate of the cemmunity-at- 
large; and at the same time his fate is seen as reciprocal with the 
actions of the community. This theme may be unique te the concentration 
camp survivor, and it may be particularly pronounced in the Eastern 
European Jewish survivors, stemming, as I see it, from that specific 
cultural milieu and its singular sense of communal interdependence. 
The ideological origins of this stress on communal responsibility 
may bo found with the biblical answer to Abel’s " Am I my brother’s 
keeper?" to which the reply has always been a firm "Yes." The Prophets 
in turn made a sense of community part of the national ethical impulse. 

But only the exigencies of historical circumstance provided the 
impetus whereby individual responsibility for communal events reached 
its most complete form. The isolation of the Jew and his shtetl. or 
ghetto-village, necessitated, on pragmatic grounds, a communal con¬ 
sciousness in which caring for the poor and the stranger was in harmony 
with the theocratic demands of the religious heritage. One*s relatives 
were of the utmost concern, and in an extended kinship system where 
the most obscure and distant relationships are searched for and con¬ 
sidered valuable the "relatives" may have included most of the village; 
when there was no bleed relationship to be established the dictum "All 
Israel are brothers" elevates them to the level of family anyway. 
This sense of communal responsibility is felt net only in the 
realm of charity but in the area of individual action as well. To sin 
in public, for example, is far worse than to commit the same indiscre¬ 
tion in private for it may also mislead ethers. If one is known te have 
committed some ethical or legal indiscretion it is incumbent upon 
members of the community te make the transgressor aware ef what he has 
dene, te deter him from recidivism in the future, and te remind him 
that individual actions have communal implications in the eyes ef both 
God and man.^® 
This last is the key points individual actions have communal 
implications. The biblical pattern is again instructive. In the des¬ 
truction ef Sodom God offers te save the city if Abraham can find fifty 
righteous people in it. Later, as In the prophet Jeremiah, the nation 
is collectively punished because its individual members "hearkened net 
nor inclined their ear te turn from their wickedness." ^9 This 
tradition ef community punishment for individual and mass sin extended 
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dorp into the life ef the shtotl; it provided the rationale fer 
persevering pogroms and the continued oppression that was their 
historical let. 
With this legacy we can readily see hew the concentration camp 
survivors, many ef whom were from Eastern European origins and imbued 
with this comiiunitas. might have a good deal ef their residual imagery 
revolving around issues of communal responsibility. This sense is 
explicitized by Chaim Kaplan's description of the Warsaw Ghettot 
Everyone has come to realize that he is an organic part 
of a whole body. Anything good fer the whole body is good 
for him, and the reverse... The concept that "all Jews are 
responsible for one another” has stepped being merely a 
slogan or metaphor. It is realized in us. 120 
This is markedly distinct from the experience ef extreme situation 
survivors in whom the initial response was an illusion ef centrality, 
a feeling that "I alone am affected." 121 This, however, seems to me 
to be a function ef actual aleneness, or ef disasters ef sudden impact 
fer which there was no preparation.The first reason is given credence 
by the finding in mine cave-ins where groups ef men were trapped together 
122 
there never seems to be this perception ef aleneness. When one sees 
his fellow victim, no matter what type ef disaster, the illusion ef 
centrality disappears, but oven when no longer present it is never 
replaced by a sense ef communal suffering. The concentration camp 
survivor,on the ether hand, never has an illusion ef centrality. His 
perception is always one ef the com minity being threatened by and resp¬ 
onding to the disaster in a shared way. 
Seme ef this realization was pleasant fer the community meant 
respite, as it had throughout Jewish history, from the brutal realities 
ef oppressions 
V 
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The reception given to us by Jews in Poland aftor deportation 
thero who had been informed, was so warm and marvelous, that 
for a moment one was able zo forget the pain, the misery and 
the want... The people sacrificed evory thing. 1^3 
In the camps tliis communal liability had practical implications for sur¬ 
vival I 
There were unfortunatcly such people who fell in disfavor 
to the great gentlemen the SS and they beat them constantly, 
do wg agreed among us that we shall go with a proposal that 
daily ten men would report for beatings to soothe their bes¬ 
tial instincts and to request that in a lager of seven 
hundred people that en every seventieth day each ene would 
be beaten and not te boat day in and day out the same ^^ 
poople with the result that they were being boaten to death. 
The pleasantries however, are the exception rather than the rule. For 
the mest part it is the communally shared horrors that are remembered. 
Survivors not only remember their ewn terror, but in a way that seems 
singular t® this experience they remember feeling, together with their 
individual fears, a sense of communal despair, of shared terror. 
I don’t want to talk about what they have dene te me, I 
want to talk about what they have done te all of us. 
We started to wail and scream. The screams were rising 
te hoaven. It became like a choir. 
In this last passage there is a hint ef connection with a community be¬ 
yond the contemporary. "Screams rising te heaven" suggests identifica¬ 
tion with a historical community as they are perceived residing in 
heaven and as fellow sufferers, as well as a form of supplication te 
the divinity. This becomes mere clear in the following brief description 
of the first days ef internment at a French deportation camp* 
Every time a woman or a child would raise their 
voice crying the whole Veledrom, as many as thore 
were, could cry with them. The destruction of the 
temple! 127 
Reference to the Temple is indicative ef a sense ef connection with a 
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biblical cemmunity af victims that has represented the histarical 
fate of the Jaw far same twa thausand years. From the liturgical 
literature ta the commonplace idiomatic expression every tragedy 
that has befallen the community is placed within the context af the 
greatest of tragedies - the destruction af the Temple of Solomon. 
Elia Wiesel's recant naval, A Beggar in Jerusalem, characterizes the 
significance of the Temple and its geographic location Jerusalem. 
A name; a secret. For the exiled a prayer. For all 
others, a promise. Jerusalem! seventeen times destroyed 
yet never erased. The symbol of survival. 128 
This has significant uses as a defense against threats to one's real 
and symbolic life. To be firmly rooted in a continuing historical 
process, even if it is one where the role is that of victim, is to be 
part of an immortalizing process. What the survivor feels is that being 
a link in an unbroken chain of sufferers insures one’s ultimate survival! 
just as Jerusalem has survived repeated ravishings so tee will the 
people of Israel survive, even this catastrephe. Being part of this 
cemmunity that has shewn a gift for survival can be a mode ef achieving 
a sense ef immortality, and being part ef a victimized cemmunity dees 
a geed deal te assuage one’s guilt by reminding him that his is a 
histerical role ef victim rather than assailant, and that he has always 
been a sufferer rather than a victimizer. 
This is a double-edged swerd however, for in the histerical context 
the community is always seen as suffering for its sins. Thus te identify 
with the cemmunity as victim also entails assumption ef role as one who 
has traditionally brought misfortune down on himself. The histerical 
context this time festers the maneuvers by which the victims become 
causal agents. The '’Chosen People" has incumbent upon it a higher 
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moral responsibility, which if not fulfilled will brine; down the wrath 
of God.Again, via a devious, but nonetheless psychologically real, reute, 
guilt gives eno the ability to place his misfortunes in a rational con¬ 
text. Within the concentration camps the negative image of a brutal 
Jew gives each survivor an epitome of his own possiblo guilt by compli¬ 
city or by failure of communal responsibility. 
The Jewish militia of the ghettos and the "block elders" or 
"capos" in the camps are the major sources of this negative Imagery. 
Tne contrast between the German gentile and what is expected of the 
Jew marks these collaborating Jews as deviants? 
The Germans, well I can’t expect anything from them.. 
One Jew wants to do that to another. That is something 
horrible. ^9 
These were individuals whose behavior was completely alien to the expecta¬ 
tions and the norm of the shtetlS 
... a Jewish capo. But that torments a person. It makes 
one a revolutionary. Here is a Jew and he beats me. He 
is the same as I am, but because he has more to eat and 
because he is no longer in the lager he behaves that way... 
It does something to a person...And to my great regret I 
also have to toll you, it is true, and I am still ashamed 
that I have to tell such a thing, but it is the pure truth. ^ 
With this sense of shame is a sense of guilt over failed responsibility 
in net having deterred one who is "the same as I am" fre» becoming an 
accomplice. Net only did rare individuals fail to live up to the ethical 
ideal but 
a Jowish lager; one was only under Jews and still one was 
ready to kill the ether for a little bread, just so out 
of irritation, the other fellow was net considered a human 
being 
The entire community, even though placed in extreme and extenuating 
circumstances, is felt to be guilty of becoming the same as the oppressors. 
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Even if their actions were infinitesimal in relation to their persecuters 
and understandable under the circumstances the meral lapse is 
inexcusable and places them in the same category as the SS. In this 
landscape of ethical absolutes magnitude ef action is not recognized, 
only purity ef intention is reckoned. Se where the distinction between 
assailant and victim diminishes, the survivor, by neither deterring 
his neighbor or being absolutely blameless in his own mind, perceives 
himself as contributing to the downfall ef his friends and his entire 
people. In essence he can only see himself having dene this to insure 
his own survival. The language of a Lithuanian survivor who had been in 
the camps as a twenty-year old indicates this feelingJ the Jewish militia 
in the moment when their own lives were in peril they 
preferred to beat kapores the^ljves ef ether Jews se 
that they could remain alive ' 
The language, like that ef'burnt offerings," implies sacrifice. Beating 
kapores is a ritual that was carried out the morning preceding the 
Day of Atonement in which a hen or reester is sacrificed in lieu ef 
one's sins for the year. In the words of the survivor this reflects the 
feeling that one sacrificed the life ef another in order to survive. 
Each survivor maintains this imagery of communal responsibility in 
which individuals and the community as a whole is in seme way at fault 
for allowing or being accomplice to the sacrifice. 
The temptation to place blame on a few aberrant individuals cannot 
b© succumbed to because "he is the same as I am."; the sense of total 
communal interconnection disallows this way ef freeing oneself from 
a shared guilt. Individual responsibility is seen as always having its 
origin in communal responsibility, and an individual action is seen as 
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a possibility for every member of the group, and in seme ways a 
reflection of the group animus. 
The concentration camp atmosphere was one in which individual 
action could only be a negation of the sense of community. Prime 
Levi, author of Survival in Auschwitz, speaks of the contrast! 
before the camps 
I had net yet been taught the doctrine that I was later 
to learn so hurriedly in the lager: that man is bound to 
pursue his own ends by all possible means... 1-33 
But in the lager things are different: here the struggle 
to survive is without respite, because everyone is desper¬ 
ately and ferociously alone. If seme Null Achtzen vacillated, 
he will find no one to extend a helping hand; on the contrary 
someone will knock him aside, because it is in no one’s 
interest that there be one more "musselman” dragging himself 
to work every day; and if sorneome, by a miracle of savage 
patience and cunning, finds a new method of avoiding the 
hardest work, a new art which yields him an ounce of bread, 
he \-dll try to keep his method secret, and he will be esteemed 
and respected for this, and will derive from it an exclusive 
personal benefit; he will become stronger and so will be 
feared, and. who is feared is, ipse facte, a candidate for 
survival. 5 
One’s chances for survival were improved by a self-centered renunciation 
of everything but self-seeking. So for those who survived the note of 
discord remains: we are of the same skin, what is there to say I would 
note have done the same if given the opportunity; and more plaguing, I 
did survive-that in itself is proof that I did do the same, for survival, 
by definition, is impure by the fact that it means livi ng beyond another’s 
death0 The whole experience may be apprehended in communal terms: the 
survivor has suffered with, shared and renounced ties to, and lived 
beyond his community. In each aspect of the experience the central fact 
is that of death, and although the imagery of community serves as a 
historically-derived base for examination of group culpability it also 
' 
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sets the stage for the individual survivor, as part of this blameworthy 
community, to be cencerned that perhaps he teo beat kapores with the 
lives of the dead. 
Mutant Death and the Sins of the Fathers 
The death of children and, te a lesser degree, women presents a 
profoundly painful series ef images for the surviver te deal with. 
Nearly every survivor has retained memories ef children dying. 
(What is the most terrible story you remember from the 
concentration camp?J 
It was when we came to Birkenau and they took the children 
with the women and they started te threw them in the fire. ^ 
the children... they experienced the worst. They were si 
murdered. They were exterminated. Net like human beings. 
Never shall I forget the little flames ef the children, 
whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath 
a silent sky. Never shall I forget these flames which 
consumed my faith forever.. 
There are a number ef themes here which give particular intensity to the 
images ef dying children. The issues ef symbolic immortality and mutant 
death are particularly important. Liften speaks ef symbolic immortality as* 
Man’s need, in the face of inevitable biological death, 
to maintain an inner sense of continuity with what has 
gone on before and what will go on after his own indivi¬ 
dual existence. From this point of view the sense of im¬ 
mortality is much more than a mere denial of death; it is 
part ef a compelling, life-enhancing imagery binding each 
individual person te significant groups and events removed 
from him in place and time. It is the individual’s inner 
perception ef his involvement in what we call the historical 
process. The sense of immortality may be expressed bielegi- 
cally by living en threugh (er in) one’s sons and daughters; 
theelegically in the idea ef a life after death er ether forms 
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of spiritual conquest of death; creatively, or through 
"works" and influences persisting beyond biologic death; 
through identification with nature, and with its infinite 
extension into timo and space; or oxporientially, through 
a foeling-state - that of experiential transcendence - se 
intense that at least temporarily it eliminates time and 
death. 138 
Herein lies the critical point for understanding the heightened intensity 
of mourning where less is felt as being out of the natural order, in¬ 
volving a child or mother, or simply being unexpected. In all cases 
the sense of organic continuity is lost, and with this less cernes the 
dissolution of man* s sense of symbolic immortality.Erikson describes 
this feeling (under another name) with exquisite clarity: 
an ego-chill, a shudder which comes from the sudden 
awareness that our non-existence - and thus our utter 
dependence on a creator who may choose to be impolite - 
is entirely possible. Ordinarily we feel this shudder 
only in moments when a shock forces us to step back from 
ourselves, and we do not have the necossary time or 
equipment to recover instantaneously a position from 
which to view ourselves again as persistent units subject 
to our own logical operations. Where man cannot establish 
himself as the thinking one ( who therefore is), ho may 
experience a sense of panic; which is at the bottom of our 
mythmaking, our metaphysical speculation, and our artificial 
creation of "ideal" realities in which we become and remain 
the central reality. 139 
An ego-chill - this is the essence of it. In witnessing death the sense 
ef connection is lost and it terrifies, for it brings us the specter 
of eur own mortality. The poet’s insight is most astute: 
And yet you will woep and know why... 
Nor mouth had, no nor mind, expressed 
What heart heard of, ghost guessed l 
It is the blight man was born for. 
It is Margaret you mourn for. 1^ 
A correlate of the lost immortality-fear ef death motif is the 
concept of appropriate death - the feeling that death has come in its 
proper time and place. Although the original papers ef Weisman and 
V 
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Hackett dealt with feelings about death of self their parameters 
are equally useful in delineating attitudes toward death in general, beth 
ef self and ether. The sense ef appropriate death requires reduced 
conflict, compatibility with an ego ideal, the fooling that important 
relationships will be restored by death, and that death will bring 
about tho consummation of a wish. It can be seen that each of these 
categories has inherent a sense of completeness and centinuity. If a 
mourner feels that the deceased "appropriately'8 died, that their 
lives were complete, that the dead had found their niche within a 
historical superstructure, then mourning can proceed relatively 
unhindered. When we speak of one’s life as a "closed book" this is what 
we m-an. To take it a step further, if the potential for appropriateness 
is seen this tee makes mourning mare peaceful. Te restate it from the 
obverse side: it is only when death is seen as senseless, as totally 
unpredictable, as the premature termination ef an incomplete life 
are our symbolic defenses broken down. Each ef these categories is 
important.senseless-boyond what we know as the natural order; 
unpredictable-death operant in what seems a sudden historical vacuum 
provokes our worst fears; premature and incomplete-a function ef the 
first two and itself the antithesis ef eur basic hopes from life, 
maturity and completeness* In a word it is mutant death which evokes 
eur fear ef the absurd, ef eur non-existence* 
The death of children epitomizes all of the negative aspects 
of symbolic immortality, and is the prime example of mutant death* 
The death ef a child interrupts the natural order and flew ef generations; 
this is mere threatening to one’s sense of symbolic immortality than 
the death ef a contemporary because it is a disruption and cessation 
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of the living example of one’s persistence beyond the biological 
self. Immortality through one’s children is the most palpable mode 
available and is probably the most important component of the entire 
symbology that projects us beyond death. It follows from this that 
bereavement over the death of a child is the most distressing and 
long-lasting, for it requires greater reconstructive work on a 
142 
fractured symbology. There is also evidence, shown primarily in 
childhood, but I think valid throughout life, that loss of the mother 
provokes more intense grief than loss of the father.That this is 
the case, I believe, is because, as R. J. Liften has peinted out 
in a different context, "the focus from which woman’s psychological 
life emanates - is close identification with organic life and its 
perpetuation.Not only does the woman horsolf have this perception, 
but she is equally perceived by others from the aspect of her 
"motherliness." Women, just as children, are, respectively, the repesitery 
and incarnatien of symbolic immortality. This emphasis on metherliness 
is noteworthy in the language of the survivers whe frequently refer 
* 
net to women but to mothers. 
♦The eld are also part of this general imagery of innocence in that 
they are felt in their old age to have grown wise beyond sin. This is 
expressed in lines from Nelly Sach’s mysteriously beautiful peem "Even 
the eld men's last breath:" 
Even the ©Id men's last breath 
That had already grazed death 
You snatched away 
You thieves of genuine hours of death. 
Last breaths and the eyelids' Good Night 
Of one thing bo sure! 
The angel, it gathers 
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The death of achild in the concentration camp is not only out 
of the natural order but it represents a total dislocation from tho 
natural setting as well. Death in the concentration camp 
cannot be compared with a case wh^n a child, dies, is 
sick and dies in its own bed. 
In this sense of dislocation, that even a child dies away from home, 
the connection with communal survival is evidenced. In most cultures 
the child symbolizes the future survival ef the culture. Thus, the 
image of the child goes beyond individual immortality to include in it 
tho survival of the community. For European Jews this was no less the 
case: 
The child murdered in sleep 
Arisos; bends down the tree ef ages 
And pins tho white breathing star 
That was once called Israel 
To its topmost bough. 
Spring upright again, says tho child, 
To where tears mean eternity 
whimpering of little children in little smoke 
mother’s cradle songs in smoke . 
Israel's way of freedom in smoke- 0 
In both excerpts the child is the means by which the natien gains or 
loses its immortality. This being the case, the child was protected above 
all else. This is a common recollection* 
Father told him: "'For the sa^e the children, ge#w 
He himself remained there. 
What you discarded 
From tho old men’s premature midnight 
A wind of last broaths shall arise 
And drive this unloosed .star 
Into the Lord’s handsi * * 
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This protection was extended even to death! 
When the children were found many mothers wanted to go 
with the children together because it was announced that 
the children will be shot. 150 
A mother who was burned alive is remembered as calling out from tho flames! 
My child stay alive. I 'will watch over you. 
I will keep you in my hand. 151 
Tho following survivor who had be»n through Auschwitz and its neighbor- 
camp 3irk~nau, the sole survivor of his entire family, and saw thoro 
what he believed to be the annihilation of the Jewish peoplo was moved 
to Terozin (Theresienstadt) just prior to liberation. There ho saw 
Jews well-dressed, little children...Children tho kind 
wo had not seen for two years. Childron like tho which 
we have seen ourselves, how they were burned in the 
crematories, so now we could not believe these wore 
Jewish children. 5 
For him survival of his people is difficult to believe and it is 
crystallized in his reaction to seeing the childron. A directress 
of an orphanage for displaced childron, most of whom had boon in 
concentration camps, and who herself was a survivor, makes apparent 
tho significance of a group of children who had been hidden in monasteries 
during t^e war and had nearly died thore(the monasteries wore virtually 
under sioge at th^t time) and who wore nursed back to health under her 
care i 
Those children are as if they belonged to us. They belong 
to the entire Jewish people. I believe that their place is 
in Palestine. 153 
The children are felt to be part of the entire community, and as symbols 
of communal survival they are to be sent to the place that is symbolic of 
tho national aspiration for continuity. 
It is clear, I think, how tho images of children symbolize on two 
) 
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levels the sense of immortality, as representatives ef communal 
survival, and the coherence of the natural order. This is why the 
imagery of dying children is so profoundly engraved in the memory 
of the survivor. It is an accurate psychological response that in 
Semprun's novel The Long Voyage the death of children is the central 
and most moving image. It serves as the raison d*etre ef the work: 
And maybe I shall be able to tell about the death of the 
Jewish children, describe that death in all its details, 
solely in the hope - perhaps exaggerated, perhaps un- 
roalizeable - that these children may hear it... The story . 
of the Jewish children in the name ef the Jewish children.1-5 
Aside from its intimate connection with lest immortality and 
death fears we are horror-struck at tho death ef a child because ef 
a tradition which believes in tho innocence ef tho child. For the 
survivor as well 
The death ef a man is only the death ef a man, but the 
death of a child is the death of innocence, the death of 
God in the heart ef man. ^-55 
Since the child is himself innocent there must be another reason for 
his mutant death aside from personal guilt. The challenge posed by the 
poet Yitzhak Katzenelson becomes a vital one: 
They, tho children of Israel were the first in deem 
and disaster... 
Say then, how have these lambs sinned. 
Why in days of rioom.are they the first victims 
of wickedness... 1^^) 
With the disruption ef the natural order the specter of the absurd is 
reevoked, and again the tendency is to supply reason where none is 
available. Here "reason** takes the form of a myth of retributive 
continuity. The cultural residuum - derived from and best expressed as 
tho biblical "The sins ef the fathers shall be visited on the children" - 
provides the psychological rationale. Reasonless mutant death is unaccep- 
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table, so t’no chile is seen as punished because of the parent, serving 
as both moans and object of that punishment# To be sure, this is a 
universal phenomenon seen in many instances where the parent watches 
his child die. With the memory of dying children confronting him 
the concentration camp survivor finds it easier to feel himself at fault 
than live with absurdity and a defunct sense of symbolic immortality. 
He remembers that 
Hundreds of youths fell as burned offerings^*” 
The phrasing is important: burned offerings recurs frequently when survi¬ 
vors are speaking of the dead, and particularly when they are speaking 
of children. I believe it to be mere than idiomatic. Burned offerings 
were the animals sacrificed at the temple in expiation for one's sina. 
It is the language of sacrifice and implies exactly that perception! 
the child is sacrificed for the sins of the parents. This mother who 
survived her young daughter remembers the daughter's last words 
before deportation! 
Au revoir, Maman. Courage. I am already sacrificed. See 
that you save yourself with the little ones. I give 
myself up already as a sacrifice.^5b 
That this memory is guilt-laden there can be little doubt. The fellewing 
tale reinforces the sense of the child as sacrifice. 
My ton year old daughter said to me, "Mother why do you 
suffer so on my account? Just leave us here and try to save 
yourself"..."Mothermy little girl would say, "pray to 
god that we may have an easy death, and let us go by our¬ 
selves" ...Later on the Ukranian guards reiterated her words 
net perish on account of one. My life is 
And so we see it again here! death fear subverted to guilt. For 
the survivor the question posed by Desteyevski*s Grand Inquisitor has an 
answer! A child dies because ef the guilt ef his parents in a scheme ef 
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things that if unfathomable is at least erowrly. 
The Landscape ef Hell 
Tho concentration camp survivors remember many of the atrocities 
performed on them by individuals ana various groups. At tho same time 
they r-tain a subtle sense of the landscape itself collaborating in their 
destruction. In an almost Kiltonic way the natural environment seems 
to be part of the plan for extermination as it takes on aspocts 
of the sinister. This symbolizes fer the survivor a feeling ef total 
abandonment and victimization. The peint of comparison is tho beneficence 
implicit in the tradition that the sun always skines on Jewish holidays. 
In mark&d contrast to this it is remarkable hew frequently the malevolent 
elements are remembered. Rain, snow and winter appear to have become tools 
of the Nazis! 
We wont out to work, it rainea. Winter ana we frezen,hungry. 
As we shall see with the imagery of work, the elements alse take en 
the import of foreboding; 
'Wo sensed when we arose that something is net good 
in that day. It was a little chilly. l6l 
The cennoctien with death images becemes quite explicit as nearly every 
recollection of the death marches recalls an unnospitable envirenment 
linked with pictures of dead bodies. This passage by a Pelish orphan 
who was in the camps as a thirteen year-old is representative of the 
recurrent imagery; 
The whole read... it snowed. It was winter when we went 
eut. Every ten meters there was a cerpse. *32 
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Wnero the imagf' of landscape as collaborator is a more nebulous ono 
the image of the camp itself is brought into a very spocific frame of 
reference - that of Hell. 
This is Hell. Today, in our times, hell must be 
like this. 163 
Again it is remarkable how often the camp is spoken of in terms of hell, 
and more startling is how frequently tho name of Dante is mentioned. 
After the camp oxperien~e it is felt 
... one could understand the meaning of Dante. 
Yet for the reality ef the concentration camps the imagination of 
Dante is merely a starting point. On watching the flames frem the 
crematoria one survivor realizes with bitterness 
Dante was just a deg. They the SS knew it much 
better. 165 
As another survivor noted with less acrimony : 
In hell one does not see such sights as one has 
seon here. 166 
The brutality and absurdity of the camps eould only be placed in an 
extrahuman setting, for otherwise it defies comprehension. As we noted 
earlier the survivor’s sens# of th# experience is that ef utter in- 
describability. The imagery ef hell provides one more frame of refer¬ 
ence whereby there can be a comprehensible imagination ef the helecaust 
that was the concentration camp. 
In a broad sense the imagery of a malevolent landscape is part 
ef the imagery ef hell. Dante and the Bible both testify te the 
unkindne-ss ef the elements in Hell. Dante’s Hell is a place ef ''endless 
night, fierce fires and shromming cold;" Biblical Kell is a dismally 
"dark place where there is nothing but grief ... during the obscurity ef 
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night and the severity of the cold." But the images of hell and a 
malevolent landscape are important to the survivor for reasons other 
than the similarity in inclement weather - on# reason is sensory, 
the other psychological. The sensory basis for the imagery is the 
sheer physical environment ofthe camps: the sight and smell of burning 
bodies conjured up one’s nightmares of hell. Flames and vile odors 
are part of the archetypal imagery of hell and the concentration camp 
survivor had ample opportunity to associate both with hellish 
implications: 
What...I am unable to forget is the firo by day and night 
...and the pits, which wore installed in the year 19^ 
when again Hungarian transports wore arriving, rendered 
a sight which does not yield to description, because one 
imagined himself in a living hell. One was encircled all 
around by fire. 167 
The second reason for the intensity of this imagery, and the prime 
psychological underpinning for their vividness and frequency lies 
in the way they relate to issues of death and guilt. The relation¬ 
ship between hell and death is clear: the malficonc© of the elements 
and the horrors of hell are part of our shared imagination of death. 
Also, for the concentration camp survivor the historical facts 
speak for themselves - when the weather get worse mere of their fellows 
died. 
The imagination of the dark and fiery hell has its roots in the 
dynamics of guilt as well. No hero in literature, for example, dies 
with the sun shining, for only the malicious of heart are consigned 
to th® eternal inclemenc© of hell, or eternal death. The imagery of hell 
is that of lest immortality, lost because those in it have sinned. 
The image of hell is net simply tho arch-fire imago or th© metaphor by 
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which we describe horrors, it is the mind’s place of punishment, the 
place where the guilty go. It is on this level that the connection 
with guilt is realized, and here again *>n a communal level as well 
is the process by which the victim feels he has had a hand in his 
victimization. This shared residuum of guilt imagery that is part 
of our universal mythology provides the context by which the victim 
gains mastery over his situation. Suffering for one's sins means 
that one is in control of the factors prodeucing punishmont. To be 
able to blame oneself for the vagaries of history means that we aro 
in a sense in control of that history. Thus the survivor focuses 
on the imagery of hell in order to ostablish the context of guilt 
and thus, in a monstrous fashion, to establish a context of rationality. 
The concentration camp is a distinctive hell in which rosult has no 
relationship to motive, and this is the absurdity that the survivor 
faces: 
The capos or thfe SS men without fault on our part they 
called out prisoners and flogged tnem to death. 
Tho disruption of cause and effect is beyond belief and difficult to 
cope with: 
Mevor in life had we dreamed that wo completely 
blameless people will be put in a concentration 
camp only because we aro Jews. ^9 
This landscape of the absurd cannot bo psychologically sustained because 
it contains within it the threat of existential annihilation, a 
threat that we simply cannot cope with. Mental balance depends on 
a perceived rational relationship between action and result; the 
third law of thermodynamics is a psychological requirement as well as 
a physical one. Tho concentration camp survivor whose held on causal 
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relationships must be somewhat more tenuous by the nature of his 
experience has need for a cautious sens* of control over his environment* 
Human historical experience provides the psychological modus vivenrii. 
The survivor feels guilty tnis time by placing the entire event 
within the metaphor of hell and placing his role in the event as that 
of victim-for-sins. He makes an economical choico in his struggle 
for mastery, but one with terrible consequences. 
The Clothes of the Dead 
This is the first of three images which we may term relational 
in that all three-clothing, food, and work-are markers whereby the 
modorn perceives the regularity of his universe. Together they form 
a triumvirate of the mundane; where tne previous imagery has beon one 
of relatively esoteric abstractions this imagery is distinguished 
by its ubiquity, and because of its ubiquity it may be frequently 
present to provoke unpleasant memories in the survivor. What we 
may consider the banal of the ordinary may be for tho survivor 
highly charged symbols of a well-remembered past that are intimately 
connected with thoughts of guilt and death. 
As relational symbols they also represent, in and of themselves, 
aspects of organic continuity; and conversely, as survivors make 
evident, their disruption provokes foar of lost connection, when 
clothing was immediately taken away on entry inte the camp, a 
survivor recalls 

63 
That was a big blow because those wore the 
only tokens of remembrance ^0 
One's clothing symbolized the style and order of his former life as well 
as a link to that life. Just as the natural relationship to one's 
former clothing was dislocated so too were the symbols of that formor 
life annihilated. 
Once in the interstices of the concentration camp clothing 
became both a prized and despised commodity. It was prized because 
of its practical value for survival in conditions that were always 
less than benevolent; despised because it became inseparable from 
images of the dead and dying. 
When we went to the shower hall we saw the clothing 
of the people who wore not anymore, lying there. The 
clothing was still there. We recognized the clothing of tho 
people who had left and returned no more.1'1 
Clothing becomes a metaphor for death 
From the laundry, the laundry I come 
from washing the garments of death 
from washing the shirt of Eli, 
Washing out the blood, washing out the sweat 
child-sweat, washing eut death. 
As every survivor knew 
the clothing was that of the killed ^^3 
and it became symbolic of those lost lives. And survival inasmuch as 
it depended on adequate clething, then became a function of ethers 
deaths : 
In Auschwitz there was enough to wear. There 
was the clothing of the dead. They were burning 
people every day. 
In a sense that was not entirely unrealistic the survivor felt himself 
profitting from those deaths. Compounding this only slightly, at 
the other end of the Nazi machine clothing meant an unwilling act 
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of charity, for after the survivors wero given the rags the intact 
goods went to the German citizenry at home. This too the survivors knew# 
The clothing of the dead also entered into communal imagery in 
that it was often symbolic of a disparate but total destruction of 
the community: 
The clothes and all the belongings were taken away 
and wore distributed even to other prisoners... In 
Buchenwald we wore later the suits in Auschwitz. 
There is a sense of shared fate with those in other concentration 
camps. However they know this or imagined it the concentration earap 
survivor feels via the clothing a sense of communal loss and at tho 
same time a sens® of guilt that he has benefited from oven these 
distant deaths. 
As a further imprint of this memory the sight of a lost friend’s 
or relative's clothing was often the last contact the survivor had 
with any remnant of the dead and with the dead themselves. The sheck 
of recognition could be frighteningly profound: 
... they were gassed 2nd the next day the clothing that 
these people were wearing was already back in the laundry. 
It was in this manner that I recognised the clothes of 
one of my colleagues who came with me from Berlin. His 
number was marked on the clothes. 
It was said they go... to Lublin. But since within an hour 
the same clothes, that means the uniforms with the numbers 
...would come back. Wo knew exactly that people were not 
transported to Lublin in the nude, and it did net take 
long before we got the word... that the people were gas- 
killed. W 
As the imagery of clothing becomes symbolic of the dead it 
evokes the problematic relationship to the dead that the survivor must 
continually cope with. To use the clothing of tho dead for purposes 
of survival means, in effect, using the death ef another to one's 
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advantage. Clothing is part and parcel of the mien of the dead 
which should be sacred and untouchable. Not only is the survivor 
using the dead for his gain but he is violating their sanctity as 
well. The difficulties associated with utilizing anything belonging 
to the dead is testified to by this survivor who went about in his 
underwear for a time after his pants had been torn off: 
^Couldn't you get yourself another pair of pants?} 
No that was impossible unless I would have taken 
them from a dead man.^'° 
The choice he made might well be considered pathologic but to take 
from the dead was tainted with feelings of guilt. Even though clothing 
might mean a better chance at survival it was always at the expense 
of others. In this story of forty-four men taken to be executed the 
only one rescued recalls the event through the metaphor of clothing: 
The truck with forty-four heaps of clothing stood 
in front of tho clothing shed. Wiosenthal was told 
to get his clothes and shoes ’without disturbing the ether 
heaps.1 
The image of clothing is linked to his escape in which it became 
the equivalent of the lives he could not save, who died in his stead. 
The entire step-wise process from questions of priority to 
causality is again psychically reenacted so that tho imagery of 
clothing of the dead evokes not so much tho memory of death as 
the accusations of guilt: 
afterwards they had to take the clothes which everybody 
recognized from her mother, from her sister, from her 
children They cried with bloody tears. They had to take 
those clothes and sort them. And everybody was thinking 
’Why did I not go together with them? Why did we remain 
alive* 180 
Again the survivor is given to feel as if he had a choice in the matter. 
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Tho clothing of the dead becomes symbolic of his failure to "go 
together vdth them" - which means instead of them. 
Food 
Recollections of starvation and hunger can be heard from every 
concentration camp survivor. For most they are part of a factual 
recounting of the deprivations suffered, but in others these memories 
are of life and death struggles and hence have rather painful 
symbolic implications. The memory of food, contains, as does much 
of the survivor’s residual imagery, dual aspects. It is related to 
the death of another in that food was the object of many internecine 
struggles between the prisoners. Apart from tho struggles producing 
guilt, food has its own symbolic meaning in the sphere of organic 
connection by its value in aiding survival,eg. bread is tho "staff 
of life." On the first level, the struggle for feed was well - 
remembered: 
They simply fight each other for food..both of them 
would throw themselves on it. 
The memory of having taken part in these struggles is a debasing one 
for the survivor. He sees it a pure selfishness in which his desire 
for survival exceeded his humaneness. 
When I was hungry - ana for all my relatively privileged 
position, hunger often twisted my vitals - I was like an 
animal. I did not think, I did not remember, I forgot my 
husband and my child, and I thought only about one thing: 
bread. 
That he fought for survival with his fellow victim, that he in a 
i 
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>ensc became ^art of the victimizing r roccss by denying another* s right 
survival is a_ major source of .guilt. 
That bread particularly was equated with survival is clearly 
remembered by many of tho survivors: 
We had to sit around in silence because what did we have 
to defend ourselves with? Arid what could wo accomplish? 
One was fortunate to get his twenty aeca of bread. This 
was the only hope for survival. 
... tho best monent for me was before I had eaten because 
when I had my ration of bread in my pocket, in my knapsack 
... that was tho most happy moment for mo, I knew I have 
something to oat when I want to oat. But as soon as it was 
eaten I had no hope anymore. ^64 
It is ©f note, along these lines, that many stories recount how people 
in the camps, when given tho opportunity, could consume huge quantities 
of food. When these tales are recounted - as in the case of one prisoner 
who drank ten liters of soup at a sitting - there is the sense of the 
heroic about it. This in part dorives from tho view that in the camps 
eating was a way of affirming life, and the gargantuan ability to eat 
is heroic in that it embodies a particular aspect of the hereio • the 
ability to affirm life on a grand scale. 
The image of food could also assume a perverse meaning in which, 
if it suddenly did become freely available, it was an ominous sign: 
In the ghetto there already appoarea a saying: If you get 
butter today there will be an action [a raid by the SS] 
tommorrow. 1^5 
It also assumed a diabolical significance when it came to the children: 
The way in which the chidren were taken was also interesting. 
The German SS entered and gave the children chocolate, so 
that the children would be willing to go. 
Food which was formerly a symbol of life becomes unmistakeably associated 
with doath, oither by its presence or its absence in an irresolvable 
paradox of feelings. The link between the dead and the struggle for 
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survival becomes inextricably confoundf-.d with images of food, as 
evidenced by the following passage: 
And since I have suffered from hunger... andso this 
horrible thing came to happen. We enlisted a group of 
forty people and they brought us to the dead to the 
crematory and we received an additional dinner, 
He bocamo part of the "Canada Commando" which delivered bodies from the 
gas chambers to the crematoria. Ho perceives this as using the dead to 
get more food and thus guaranteeing his survival; and for this he fools 
profoundly guilty. 
The image of food then is one more image in which the central theme 
is that of one life traded for another. The survivor by the fact of 
his survival becomes a murderer and the whole community which took 
part in the struggle far survival is felt, by complieity er direct 
action, to be guilty of sacrificing the dead. 
To steal this piece of bread is to choose another man's 
death to assure your own life, or at least improve yeur 
own possibilities... Any one of us could have stolen that 
piece of bread, we were all guilty. 
Work and Forced Labor 
The residual imagery of work or forced labor is also multivalent; 
on the one hand images of death and on the other reminders of guilt. 
The fear of death connected with this imagery is also at least two-feld 
in nature. It is as the two sides of the coin on both of which you lose: 
if you did work the sheer physical exertion would kill you, and if you 
didn't the gas chambers would do the jeb of extermination. Any way one 
turned work meant death. 
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The guilt images are of a somewhat difforent nature than the others 
ve have cited in that, though the distinction between assailant and 
victim is compromised here as well, the resultant imagery of contingency 
is not felt in the same im mediate way. The imagery of one-for-on© 
sacrifice is muted as the victim perceives himself as victimizer only 
through a great deal of psychological distance. In a word this is an 
imagery of vicarious culpability. Nonetheless this imagery still pro¬ 
vokes many unwantea feelings from the mind of the survivor because in 
working for the Germans he sees himself as contributing to the aestruc- 
tion of his fellow victims. 
Primo Levi recounts his first image of the camp in terms of work! 
Wo saw a large door, above it a sign brilliantly illuminated 
(its memory still strikes me in my dreams) Arbeit Kacht Frei. 
Work gives freedom. l'r9 
For the most part v;ork was viewed as an attempt te survive. The 
freedom in the Auschwitz slogan meant only life for tho moment, as long 
as one could work. 
Work 1 We too had worrios about work l The day my man was 
working we had hopes to survive that cay. But when people 
came to the gates of the ghetto and said ’no mere work' 
required’ that was a dark day. 190 
In tho concentration camps as well 
We w*?re only conscious that during all the time we 
were in concentration camps we were always afraid to be 
unable to work. 191 
Slave labor was a forced reason for being, part of the process of 
dehumanization in which 
They were to earn their existence.19^ 
This imagory of work-equals-survival shifted with the changing 
directives of the "Final Solution." The psychehistorical connection 
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becomes evident in this shifts the nature of the historical process 
varies and the psychological imagery changes with it. As genocide 
became more important than slave labor the nature of that labor became 
altered, it 
was not workl It was to exterminate people. It was 
not v.ork, v.’ork that is of some use. 193 
Work was no longer evoking fears of death by being equated with death’s 
opposite; it became a death force in itself as it no longer held any 
guarantees for survival. The inscription ovor the gate at Auschwitz 
had a limerick ending composed by the prisoners to indicate the new 
image of work: 
Work makes free 
In crematory two and three. 19^ 
The only freedom to be found is in death. The connotation of the word 
"work" reflected this new historical emphasis. Sarly in the camp one 
would volunteer for work details knowing it had seme survival value. 
Later the "request" for laborers took on ominous meanings: 
They took us to work. We knew what that meant.195 
In Auscwitz there was n* work. 196 
Whether the work was of the survival-value type or extermination- 
werk it evokes in the survivor images of impending death. Sven the work 
which was felt to insure survival was risky for they were constantly 
being beaten on the job and death, even at the easiest work, was a 
commonplace. 
Sven under the assumption that work did hold some tenuous means te 
survival there ware considerable conflicts attendant on the actual labor. 
The question of contributing to the cause of the oppressor was a partic¬ 
ularly painful one. For some there was little question 
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To work in a fur factor;/-? But for whom? Ths Germans... 
A Jew in general should not move for the Germans even 
a finger. Ke had a task to destroy them... That is what 
i. _ i -) IQ 7 a. oOxj my iiti.er. 1 
The father on the other hand can find ways of justifying his actions: 
One fur coat,two fur coats... You cannot fight the Gormans 
and with it you won't help the Germans. 19& 
Others felt similarly that not to work meant suicide ana work had 
little effect on anything except perhaps their survival. Work in areas 
in which much of the psychological distance between labor and its offocts 
are bridged, as in the manufacture of weapons in which the victims 
can see themselves impeding the chances of survival for themselves 
and their friends?is much more difficult, for it evokes the sense 
of complicity in a direct ana undiluted fashion. Guilt is always tho 
major affect of the conscious conflict, and this produces a need to 
justify having had some part in the war effort: 
We had to do it, there was no way out.1*99 
We manufactured cannons whether wo wanted to or nop. 200 
A young Polish girl makes tho conflict generating these apologies 
explicit: 
To workl I should stamp cartridges for the machine guns, 
with which Gormans would shoot (and these were the last 
munitions factories) the Americans who camo to liberate 
us. 
She resolved her conflict by producing defective equipment. But for 
most others this resolution was eithor impossible or suicidal, and 
for them t’n® quostion of a subtle complicity is continually revived 
with the imagery of work. And with this intimation of guilt comes 
the reminder of how closely it was linked to tho death of self 
and others. Though this may bo complicity at a distance, or a vicarious 
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culpability, the guilt images are no less profound than if the 
imagery was that of sacrifice. For the survivor there is no respite 
even in a guilt that is far removed. 

CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Guilt was not invented it Auschwitz, it was disfigured there. 
- Elie Wiosel 
images of the survivor are repetitions of similar themes in 
varying abstracted contexts, the common cor© being the memory and 
awareness of a violent and relentless mortality. Yet the residual 
images are retained in such a fashion as to shift the focus from 
death to guilt, and guilt in turn is also often barred free expression 
apprehended only by going beyond the more blatant elements of the 
survivor syndrome. Explanation for the labyrinthine maneuvers and 
defenses whereby this altered perception is achieved has been offered 
in a variety of theoretical propositions, but, as John Stuart Mill was 
apt to point out, ’’truth” is most often found in the multiplicity of 
part-truths that can be garnered from those offered as absolutes. The 
case is similar her©: there are a number of astute and important 
theoretical formulations for survivor guilt, but, as I see it, a more 
accurate raison for the concentration camp survivor’s dilemma is best 
discerned by gleaning various aspects of these formulations and 
joining them in a cohesive statement. 
Perhaps the most dogmatic otiologic formulation of survivor 
pnp 
guilt has boen that of the "Anlage” school which states that 
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tne inability to recover from a traumatic experience must be and 
is without exception due to pre-morbid emotional disturbances; that 
the stress of a disaster alone - including an t-vent with the massive 
traumatizing potential of the camps - can produce chronic symptoms 
is categorically denied. Cn these grounds during the early days 
of restitutions by the German government many victims who claimed 
emotional disturbances subsequent to and resulting from the concen¬ 
tration camp experience vjcrc denied reparations. 
Anlage or promerbid psychological defects as the cause of an 
inability to recover from psychic trauma has been mentioned as a 
possibility in the Extreme Situation by Wolfenstein,203 and Archibald 
and Tuadenham noted that those with the combat syndrome had a 
higher incidence of childhood loss,^^" but both statements are some¬ 
what speculative. Other studies on the concentration camp survivor have 
suggested precisely the opposite to be true. The conclusions drawn 
from several long-term statistical studies of disparate survivor groups 
revealed that "nothing from the precaptivity period was of significance 
in the development of the concentration camp syno’rome." ^05 one 
again suspects that neither absolute is entirely true, and that there 
is some connection between premorbid events (though not necessarily 
premobid pathology) and the survivor syndrome. One example is the 
finding by Or. A. Heir that those traumatic experiences of the camps 
most often remembered were those which could be linked to precamp 
experiences, either real or fantasized. ^06 There is a melding of 
the childhood memory and the camp imago. That this is the case seems 
quite reasonable and in accordance with general psychological thinking. 
To subscribe to the anlage thoory in its entirety,howevoy is to deny 
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the destructive potential of a traumatic event as the concentration 
camp. On the other hand to entirely neglect the psychological 
equipment individuals bring to the events in their lives is to 
deny the varieties of human response. It soems that the most reason¬ 
able and precise answer lies in a concordance of opposites: individual 
psychology and historical experience are both valid aspects of the 
survivor's predicament. 
A considerably more abstract formulation, but one that I would 
suggest is also more accurate is Rosenman's attribution of guilt t© 
a regression-induced personification of the disaster in which he assigns 
the animistic assimilation of the disaster to the three 
separable units of the ego structure: the representation 
of the significant other ... the interrelationship between 
’ significant other, and the representation of the 
The roots of guilt lie in our sense of connection to others and in 
the mea culpa of our elemental egocentricity. The significant other 
of a disastor is usually conceived of as the divinity, but the origin 
of guilt lies in man himself. 
The universal feeling is that when we suffer we must be to some 
degree at fault, and, hence, guilty. We have seen that this sense 
becomes hypertrophied in the mind of the concentration camp survivor 
to a self-accusatory "Why did I survivo when I am at fault?." The 
self is the center of the question but the context is the relationship 
of the self to significant others, in this case the dead. 
The representation of tho significant other in terms of tho 
deity is operant among concentration camp survivors particularly 
in the images of community. The interrelationship between self and 
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this significant other also operates in the same area, but it is 
Rosenman's third unit, the assimilation of the disaster to represent¬ 
ation of self, that is a dominant feature of survivor guilt. The 
disaster is both consciously and unconsciously made part of one's 
self, and as an instrument of the self it not only manifests one's 
aggressive urge but also assures self-preservation since one is part 
of the disaster force rather than object of its wrath. V.'olfonstein 
attributes the sense of guilt to an "I'm glad it wasn't me who died" 
203 
attitude followed by a fear of the vindictive dead. Similarly, 
p OQ 
Fenichel ' 7 in speaking of survivors in general and Bettelhcim on 
21C 
concentration camp survivors in particular have also stated that 
guilt ever the death of another is guilt over the feeling of joy 
that it has not been oneself. Though I see the issue as a good deal 
moro complex this reinforces Rosenman's point that tho individual sees 
himself in some fashion as an integral part of the cause of other's 
destruction and as beneficiaries of that destruction. In psychoanalytic 
terms, tho victims are forced to choose their own egos as love-objects 
to the exclusion of all elso; and in striving for this psychic 
self-preservation they create an insoluable superego conflict 
211 
resulting in a chronic survivor guilt. Lifton makes this conflict 
explicit6ly clear: 
The survivor can never inwardly, simply conclude that it 
was logical and right for him, and not others to survive. 
Rather he is bound by an unconscious perception of organic 
social balance which makes him feel that his survival was 
made possiblo by others deaths: If they had not died, he 
would havo had te; if he had not survived, someone else 
would havo. Such guilt as it relates to survival priority 
may well be that most fundamental to human existence. ^12 
This viow, to be sure, is much different than the theory that the 
\ 
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survivor experiences "joy" over the death of another in his stead, 
and then self-recriminations for this death wish against others 213, 
the reasoning which serves as the basis for Bottelheim*s otiologic 
formulation: 
I believe, on the basis of my experience, that this guilt 
is not for the death of the other but for how one felt 
about it... But it is the morally unacceptable feeling 
of happinoss-that it was not I but another who drew a bad 
lot-w'nich makes one feel guilty and not that one owes one's 
existence to a follow human beings misfortune. 
... short of pathological casos such guilty feelings are 
more pretended than real. They are a p>retenso adopted 
mainly to avoid having to admit how glad one felt that it 
was they and not I who died. Thus, the claimed guilt about 
the dead is very much a denial of feelings that are morally 
unacceptable. But existential guilt is a luxury one can?1, 
afford only if one's life is not in immediate jeopardy. ^ 
The first issue here is one of definition: What is a pathological 
case? There are indications that to varying degrees the incidence of 
216 
the survivor syndrome is quite high. Similarly, it appears that 
this nigh incidence of undisputed pathology is accompanied by an 
equally high incidence of survivor guilt which appears to be existential 
in naturo. There is also evidence that in any disaster there is a 
217 
perception that the "other" sacrificed himself for the survivor; 
and corollatea with this is the higher inaiaonce of guilt seen when 
the victims are children, for the doctrine of the child's innocence 
is absolute proof that they suffered for the sins of the survivor. 
I would agree with 3«ttelheim on a rather crucial point, that 
existential guilt is not a major consideration when one's life is 
in danger. The dynamic wo have seen suggests that it is the imagory 
of existential connection that is inherent in. the camps, but it is 
only later whon hope for the return of the dead has faded and the 
concerns of the survivor focus more and mere on painful images of 

78 
death and y ing that the existential guilt itself comes int* play. 
This is v;hy there is a symptom-free interval - a period between 
liberation from the camps and t'r.6 onset of symptoms - which marks 
the transition from a latent imagery to a manifest guilt. In other 
words Bettelheim is correct to the extent that existential guilt is 
possible only when threats to mortality are not present; it involves 
a confrontation with immortality that presupposes a safe mortality - 
for the moment at least. Bettelheim may also be correct that in the 
camps one's guilt was over feeling happy about another's death and 
that some of the residual guilt stems from those feelings, but it 
scorns to rnt that the major part of the survivor's guilt is a 
"luxurious" one that deals with issues of organic connection, and 
that enables im to recover from tne psychehistorical dislocations of 
his experience. 
Bethalhfcim's formulation has been phrasec in more doctrinaire 
psychoanalytic terms. Szatmari suggosts that the survivor's problem 
is his inability to copo with " aregurgitation of the early aggressive 
fantasies now projected onto reality," 218 that is, the fantasios 
derived from infantile aggressions and death wishes toward parents 
and siblings. 219 
This relationship between infantilo fantasies and guilt suggests 
that thoro may ba a relationship between the age during which intern¬ 
ment took place and the nature of survivor guilt. The evidence here 
varies from the confusing to the contradictory. Theoretically speaking 
''the economic considerations themselves are subject to phase specific 
genetic development and are different in different age periods of 
the life cycle." 220 Yet Sitinger and Askevold concluded that age had. no 
221 bearing on survivor guilt or any manifestation of the survivor syr.dromo. 
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Liiederland, on the other hind, directly relates the severity of both 
ruilt and syndrome to the earlier the ago of trauma. ^2 Chodoff 
cites age-dcpendcnt differences in that children who survived showed 
frequent emotional maldevelopment and character deformation J ; ho 
docs net elaborate on how these differ from the emotional malaise 
of adult survivors. (Anna Freud and Sophie Dann whs worked with 
children under three years of age who had survived Terezin found that 
they were markedly hypersensitive, restless, aggressive and difficult 
to handle.^y The age factor seems to be more specifically related 
to forms of symptomatology among older ago groups. In tho twenty to 
thirty year old group chronic anxiety dominated tho syndrome and in tho 
225 
thiry to forty group depression was the major factor. There does 
not appear to be any change on the form or type of guilt evidenced. 
This agrees with recent work in which it was found that thirty to 
forty year old depressives were generally characterized by chronic 
anxiety during their twenties. What we are seeing among survivors, then, 
appears ts bo no different in this respect, from the "control" 
population of depressed patients. We are left with the impression 
that age does relate to more general manifestations of the syndrome 
but that it has no effoct on the form of guilt (excopt perhaps the 
very young in whom death guilt is incomprohendablo) although Lifton 
does point out that adolescence is a time of heightened sensitivity 
to death guilt, and exposure to massivo trauma at this time may 
produce a more intense and long-lasting conflict with death imagery 
and hence a moro profound survivor guilt. 
Another external factor in the genesis of guilt may be that of 
difforing cultural patterns of response. Here again there is no clear- 
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cut evidence either way, but tlicro ire some significant indicators 
that these factors may be important. Wolfenstein has noted several 
differences in response to the extreme situation among varying 
. 22? . + , D , . 0 . 228 , 
cultural groups, ana ZborowsKi's stuay People m lain snowed 
very marked cultural differences in response to sickness and pain. 
Eitingcr*s study of Norwegian and Israeli concentration camp survivors 
229 
showed markedly less guilt in the former group, attributing it 
to the historical differences in the experiences of the two groups; 
in marked contrast to the Israeli group many of the Norwegians had 
initially been sent to the camps after arrest for acts of bravery and 
resistance, and when they returned homo they were greeted as heroes. 
I would agree with this analysis and ascribe these differences to 
historical circumstance rathor than cultural variable. In another 
study Gronnor suggested that 
the end of a made of life as it has been known affects 
the German-Jewish victim much more than the Polish or 
Russian Jew who has always known a life of isolation 
and persecution. ^ 
Despite my own belief in significant cultural variables affecting 
survivor responses, this statement strikes mo as patently absurd. 
There are we know significant differences in the life styles of 
the Eastern and Western European Jewish communities, but to say 
that one group was affected more than another betrays a considerable 
intellectual myopia. Gronner seems to forget that this uprooting 
was not simply to a more oppressive ghetto, but to an extreme 
environment for which no former life pattern could have adequately 
prepared one. And among those who survived to leave the camps for 
elsewhere the annihilation of the Eastern European shtetl culture was 
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surely as dislocating as the geographical shift fron on© cosmopolitan 
center to another was for many a Western Jew. The difficulties for both 
groups were enormous and I, for one, would hesitate evaluating their 
relative severity. The issue as I see it is not who suffered more, but 
whether thero are different responses to the trauma among thoso groups 
whose suffering can barely bo fathomed, no less comparod. 
Trautman,^31 Chodoff,232 Klein, et al.^3 have all indicated that 
they found no significant cultural differences in the nature of tho 
syndromo. To my mind however tho creative response to the experience 
shows the opposite to be true. The bulk of tho work by Eastern European 
Jewish survivors has been of a fictional or memoir nature with tho 
effort being a transoendont one: in tho case of the fictions to place 
the experience within a universal spiritual framework; the memoirs aro 
efforts at completing a mission - of bringing tho truth to the world. 
In both categories the attitude toward the dead is that of unquestioning 
reveronce. Among Wostorn Europeans tho work has been a good deal more 
analytical: psychological and historical evaluations in which, though 
they also attempt to place the event in a universal frame, tho attitude 
is one of profound skepticism; and the dead aro as much subject to the 
questions (and accusations) of this analytical skepticism as aro tho 
living. Admittedly I have picked a small distorted sample of survivors 
who aro meeting their problems in tho idiom of creativity, but none¬ 
theless the differences are so marked that I think they bear mention. 
A last point also worth mention: in Wolfenstein's study of Extreme 
Situation survivors ^ and Muller’s work on concentration camp survivors^-* 
both noted a more pronounced element of guilt among Jewish groups. 
Cultural and chronological variables aside, we have noted previously 
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tho suggestion by Aosenman that survivor guilt may have adaptive 
potential by providing the illusion of control. An alternative benefit 
can be gathored from Freud regarding tho possibility of guilt associated 
with mourning giving rise to 
The self-torments of melancholiacs, which are without doubt 
pleasurable, signifying a gratification of sadistic 
tendencies and of hate, both of which relate to an object 
and in this way havo both been turned around upon tho 
seif... the sufferers usually succeed in the end in taking 
revenge, by tho circuitous path of self-punishmont, on the 
original objects and in tormenting them by means of the 
illness, having developed tho latter so as to avoid the 
necessity of openly expressing their hostility against 
their lovod ones. ^3° 
This dynamic may be extended into the realm of survivors highlighting 
the relationship between ontologic and neurotic guilt. Just as there 
are aspects of melancholia that serve as adaptational subterfuges 
designed to avoid confrontation with a more provocative reality, 
so survivor guilt may also be a means of avoiding a more painful 
ontologic guilt. There may be an unconscious, purposively induced, 
neurotic guilt which is symptomatic of a deoper malaise, rather 
than being in and of itself tho main problem. 
Among Hiroshima survivors Lifton observes that 
this identification with death, the whole constellation 
of inv;ardly exporienccd death symbolism is, paradoxically 
enough, the survivor's means of maintaining life, because 
in the face of the burden of guilt that he carries, 
particularly guilt over survival priority, his obeisance 
before the dead is his best moans of justifying and 
maintaining his own existence.^37 
Gumbel also notes adaptational aspects of survivor .guilt which serve 
similar purposes by different focus: 
it seems to me that the unrealistic guilt feelings, common 
to aLmost all survivors, are not only of a regressive 
pathologic nature. Tnere may be something positive about them. 
As against a devastating realization of a complete lack of 
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justice and of a moral order in tho world and the feeling 
of utter helplessness, guilt feelings can be an affirmation 
of meaning and a person’s ability to exert influence upon 
his own life and the course of events in general, ho who 
believes in his own guilt and responsibility establishes 
or reinstates his active involvement and part in life and 
endows it with a purpose, thus repudiating his spiritual 
annihilation. 233 
Gardner, extending Rosenman's concept to all forms of nourotic guilt, 
suggests that by giving one a sense of control guilt serves to allay 
existential anxiety ^39 and thus is always adaptive. Chodoff sees 
other benefits derived from maintaining a constant state of guilts 
survivors cannot give up their guilt 
because unconsciously this would amount to forgetting their 
parents and siblings and thus betraying their memories. It 
may also be that ... unconsciously related to a need to suffer 
in order to continue to bear witness to the cruelty to 
which they had been treated, since to get well would amount 
to forgiving the German persecutors and this to striking 
another bitter blow of betrayal at murdered friends and 
relatives. 240 
This last theme, of bearing witness, may be a oarry-over from the camps 
where tho sense of having a mission was often a life-saving defense 
similar themes served this purpose among hibakus'na as well. c It is a 
source of strongth and hope by which tho survivor can carry on. It is a 
link to the past as the mission is most often te recount what happened, 
and at the same time it is a link to tho future since the recounting is 
felt to be efficacious in preventing the same thing from over happening 
again. 
Though his maneuvers may be adaptive the unresolved issue is why 
the survivor finds himself unablo to simply discard his residual imagery. 
Why, instead, does it remain so potent a force in his mind, and why can 
he not cope with it in a way that would successfully ameliorate its 
malignant effects? In short, why must the survivor ongage in adaptive 
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manouvers around the imagery rather than achieve mastery within the 
framework of his experience? 
Lifton's concept of "death guilt" in Hiroshima survivors is crucial 
to a projected answor; he speaks of it as 
all forms of self condemnation associated with literal 
or symbolic exposure to death and dying^ including those 
usually linked with a sense of shame. 
The means by which this guilt is remembered is "the ultimate horror:" 
a specific image of the ceaa or dying with which the 
survivor strongly identifies himself ana which evokes 
in him particularly intense feelings of pity and self- 
condemnation. 244 
The ultimate horror thus form the hibakusha1s residual 
ima‘-o - tha pic totalization of. his central conflict in 
relationship to the disaster. ^ 
We have seen this to bo the caso among concentration camp survivors as 
well, and in both groups particularly potent aspects of these images 
are those of women and children who could not be saved.Thero are two 
factors eporant here. The survivor has boon confronted with a joltingly 
irrevocable awareness of death, 
not only has any preexisting illusion of invulnerability 
been shattered but he has disturbingly confronted his own 
mortality, with his own death anxioty. ^46 
Further, 
since survival by definition involves a sequence in which 
one person dies sooner than another, this struggle in turn 
concerns issues of comparative death-timing. Relevant here 
is what we have spoken of as guilt over survival priority 
along with tho survivor's sonso of an organic social balance 
which makes him feel that his survival was purchased at the 
cost of another. 247 
These factors are intimately related to one another: death fear is partly 
a consequence of the guilt that accompanies mourning over the death of 
another, and this guilt has an ontelogic base in that its imagery is that 
of organic continuity. Thus images ef women and children predominate for 

they represent,above and beyond the issues of social balance, modos 
of im.nortality. Tneir deaths present the survivor with the ultimate 
threat to his sense of symbolic immortality by embodying symbols of 
severed connection with the historical continuum, mutant death, and 
disruption of organic continuity. This ultimate threat in turn evokes 
the ultimate guilt: that the survivor in some way bears responsibility 
for his loss. In a horrible way this has some basis in a reality which 
the survivor can distort for purposes of self-condemnation because it 
was true that that many survivors could not save the dying or even caso 
their passing. It is chis sense of helplessness that inspires the self- 
reproach which gives rise to death anxiety and guilt. 
The imagery fomenting death guilt is imprinted onto the psyche 
of the survivor. 243 Subject te the continual threat ef symbolic 
reactivation - an event, werd, or sight that reevekes the imprintod 
residual image - the survivor engages in what Liften terms "psychic 
numbing." Having its roots in the defense mechanism ef denial psychic 
numbing enables the survivor te utilizo a "reversible ferm of symbelio 
death in order te avoid a pormanent physical or psychic death." 249 
There may be efforts to break out of this numbing: 
the urgency with which many Hiroshima and concentration 
camp survivors married (or remarried) and had children 
dead but te reassert vitality 
This "psychic opening-up" is all too frequently incomplete, and therein 
lies Lifton's dynamic for the survivor syndromo. He sees psychic opening- 
up as necessary te carry out the work of mourning; and tho work of mourning 
is the essential repair that must be implemented by the survivor in order 
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to formulate his relationship to the dead. This relationship to tho 
dead in turn defines his sense of immortality and connection. Psychic 
numbing which begins as a defense may end as a pathogenetic factor. 
Extremely important is Lifton's suggestion that the neurotic 
process may be a manifestation of psychic numbing. The concentration 
camp survivor’s experience suggests that this equation requires 
certain modifications. Neurotic guilt is akin to psychic numbing in 
that both arc adaptational. For tho hibakusha , however, numbing is 
utilized as a protection against images of death and personal culpabil¬ 
ity. For the concentration camp survivor self-condemnation is not denied. 
On xhe contrary, it is this sons© itself that is utilized as tho content 
of neurotic guilt which then servos to divort tho survivor's focus from 
the more painful images of death and its concommitant ontological guilt. 
In other words, where psychic numbing anesthetizes feelings about the 
central Images of death neurotic guilt inundates tho survivor with 
peripheral images of guilt. In a sense this seems to servo as a kind of 
long-term psychic numbing (which itself, it sooms, cannot bo maintained 
over extended periods). Part of this difference in diversionary tactics 
lies in the differing nature of tho two experiences. Tho concentration 
camp survivor is simply unable to deny the imagery of guilt for it is 
his only means of submerging tho moro provocative and painful ©ntic 
issues. 
Just as psychic numbing, neurotic guilt also impairs mourning, but 
where numbing doss not allow a resolution of death guilt by barring its 
expression neurotic guilt impairs mourning by effecting a_ permanent con¬ 
frontation with this guilt which serves equally well to obstruct tho 
woflk of mourning. 
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This distinction is implicit in Lifton's observation that 
concentration camp survivors, their trauma being more extensive in dur¬ 
ation at least, are more "likely to retain more diffuse and severe psy¬ 
chic impairment while in hibakusha doath imagery tends to be more pre¬ 
dominant." ^51 The key to this difference lies not only in the time 
differential but primarily with tho symbolic elements that became the 
central imagery of the camps. The residual imagery of tho Hiroshima 
survivor revolves around the dead and dying. The emphasis of the 
concentration camp survivor is on imagery of fault - that is, one's 
role in the death of others and, hence, one's moral (or ontological) 
connection to these dead. Whore the Hiroshima survivor sees tho dead in 
a direct light tho concentration camp survivor viows them through tho 
penumbra of his own complicity. Thus the degree of death guilt is not 
only related to the sheer quantity of death imagery but to the kind of 
symbolic perceptions which accompany it. I would agree with Lifton that 
the massive encounter with death and its threats to the sense of sym¬ 
bolic immortality is tho basic progenitor of survivor guilt. I would 
differ in regard to the concentration camp survivor for whom tho encoun- . 
ter with doath is intrinsically admixed with images of contingency thus 
mitigating the effects ef psychic numbing.I would maintain that tho 
historical circumstancos ef the camps and the cultural desiderata which 
the survivors brought to them place the survivor in a position whore 
rathor than avoiding guilt he immerses himself in it as protection 
from a more painful immersion in doath. 
This distinction is indicative ©f the fact that psychic numbing 
servos as a protection against threats from without - Hiroshima was 
essentially an external experience as regards the clear distinction 
) 
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betwocn assailant and victim. Where psychic numbing proves to be 
inadequate is in coping with threats from within. Although the his¬ 
torical actuality of tho concentration camps was one from without 
the distinction between victim and victimizer became blurred and the 
psychological reality was transformed into an internal threat. The victims 
imagine themselves accomplices in thoir own victimization. This forced 
impulse to self-condomnation brings the survivor into proximity of 
his ontologic fears as the issues in his mind aro doath and an existential 
crisis aoout themes of complicity in causing doath. The essence of this 
conflict, as our examination of the residual imagery has shown is the 
continuing struggle of the survivor to deal with his role in the 
event. 
Trautman has made ©bsorvations on concentration camp survivors 
which, to some extent, parallel Lifton'sl 
The background of the anxiety in survivors is tho implanted 
fear of being killed. It is an existential fear connected 
with tho dynamic of a traumatized self-preservation instinct.. 
.* It is associated with conscious and unforgettable memories 
that are not repress®! though sometimes pushed out of focus. ^52 
253 They also showed a universal felr of death for their relatives 
which gainsays Bettleheim's contention that the survivor's motivations 
were entirely selfish, do ’Wind takos this a step further: he feels that 
it is the fear of death which is the pathogenetically important 
factor in the survivor syndrome. 
... on returning to normal society, the ex-prisoner was 
unable to rid himself of the fear caused by the image of 
his own death. Too ofton he was - or is - inclined 
automatically to associate "future’1 with doath... The 
avoidance of the image of his own death gives rise to a 
persistent syndrome in the ex-prisoner. ^5^ 
I think that this statement by do Wind taken together with Lederer's 
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Ledorer's suggestion that the fear of death which originally was only 
anxiety-provoking becomes a fear of life - a lack of trust in the world 
and the possibility of goodness ^55. defines the elemental genetio 
principle of the syndrome. 
To explain survivor guilt dynamically, however, I would agree 
with Lifton and argue that the concept of impaired mourning must bo taken 
as tho crucial link between the fear «f death and survivor guilt. Mourning, 
as tho adult conceptualizes death as an absolute, is worked through via 
a oomploxly organized ritual. This 
ritual is a symbolic transformation of experiences that 
no other medium can adequately express. Because it springs 
from primary human need, it is spontaneous activity - that 
is to say it arises without intention, without adaptation 
to a conscious; its growth is undosig 
natural, however intricate it may bo. 
Though primarily intrapsychic ritual becomes centrifugal: it radiatos 
outward from the needs of tho individual to acquire a social usefulness. 
Tho role of mournor reestablishes a sens® ef place in, and belonging to, 
a comnrunity-at-large which sympathizes with his grief. There is reaffir¬ 
mation of a supportive social order with assurances of continued kinship 
from members of this social order. Perhaps most important, mourning rites 
allow for a completo immersion in grief, and, at tho same timo, a gradual 
2S7 
amelioration and systematic curtailment of this grief. Tho social 
consequences of ritual in turn reflect back centripetally to moot tho 
needs of the individual by allowing him to adopt a particular socially 
condoned style of mourning. Gorer has delineated eight general stylos, 
only two of which need concern us here. 258 ’’Time-limited mourning',' a 
specifio temporally-predetermined sequence of grieving ceremonies, is 
felt te be the most efficacious ef all the mourning styles in aiding 
ned. its pattern purely 
256 
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readjustment. ^-59 Conversely, "unlimited mourning" with a prolonged 
period of despair is seen to bo least effective; it is this stylo that 
prevails among groups with no defined ritual. W# can safely extrapolate 
and say that among those who ordinarily do have a ritual but arc unable 
to carry it out, no matter what tho reason, the tendency toward despair 
will become very pronounced. This is an important consideration, parti¬ 
cularly for Jewish concentration camp survivors who prior to internment 
adhered to a highly formalized time-limited mourning sequence. 
Even among these who have few religious ties, be it survivors 
or the general population, the social tecniques for confronting 
death are primarily religious. As Gorer, succinctly puts it? Death 
260 
is a religious preserve." For tho survivor this too presents a 
serious dilemma. The adherence to ritual was impossible and carrying 
out time-limited mourning in any way remotely resembling the proscribed 
manner was absurd even to think about. Even after the concentration 
camp experience was over achievement of ritual demands could not be 
met because the proper timo - as - well as the emetional substrate 
upon which this timing was based-had long since passed. 
The fact of cromation in the camps also contributes to tho 
survivor’s difficulty. Cromation is "felt to get rid of the dead more 
completely and finally than does burial," and, further complicating 
matters, it is taboo in Jewish ritual. Lifton’s concept of the 
"missing dead" oxplains the difficulty? 
the survivors sense that the bodios-the human remains 
- around which he might ordinarily organize rituals of 
mourning abruptly disappeared into smoke or nothingness. 
In those ways mourning is rendered shallow and unsatisfying. 
Distorted visions of death and the inability to conform to ritual in tho 
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expected manner confound the survivor’s efforts to mourn. Thcro is 
every reason to believe that in addition to his other problems the sur¬ 
vivor must also contend with impaired mourning. 
It is along the same lines that Kiedorland and Heorloo 264 
have noted an unusually frequent emergence of survivor guilt in the clin¬ 
ical sotting as unresolved mourning. Mocrloo's patients complained of 
their inability to mourn in the camps, feeling that the necessary 
rituals would have been a threat to their survival. Again, I would 
offiir that these rituals could not be carried out on a psychological 
levol either; in the camps mourning was an impossibility for part of the 
work of mourning is to allay the death fear that is ubiquitous in the 
camp itself. Simply, the sense of immortality essential for completion 
of mourning could not be attained in the concentration camp for 
the sense of continuity is a function of man’s historical perspective. 
Wo see ourselves as ereatures of history firmly rootod in a psycho- 
historical process and bound to a vast concatenation of collective 
experiences. When this bend is severed, when we see ourselvos outside 
of the natural progression of historical events, beyond the connection 
between past and future, the feeling that we are part of an erganic 
continuum is lost. The death of another temporarily gives us this 
experience. The death of another that seems wut of place in the flew 
of history further severs our sense of connection. The radical dis¬ 
placement of the concentration eamp surviver shatters all cennection. 
As one survivor put it: 
For living men, tho units of time always have a value which 
increases in ratio to the strength of the internal resources 
of the person living through them; but for us hours, days, 
months spilled out sluggishly from the future into the past 

92 
always too slowly, a valueless and superfluous material, 
of which we sought to rid ourselves as soon as possible, 
iv’ith the end of the season when the days chased each other, 
vivacious, precious, and irrecoverable, the future stood in 
front of us, grey and inarticulate, like an invincible barrier. 
For us history had stopped. ^c>5 
The concentration camp survivor has stopped out of the shared historical 
experience. Outside what has beon perceived as a continuum, insido this 
historical vacuum the survivor loses his sense of existential continuity, 
and the fear of dying pervades his psychic life. 
If, in spite of all he must contend with, the survivor can somehow 
perceive death as appropriate his fears can still be allayed by a sense 
that all is proceeding according te plan and that we arc still in control 
of our destinies. Mourning is part of the plan and we require no new 
protective symbologies to help it proceed unimpeded. let in the case of 
the concentration camp survivor evon the sense of appropriateness could 
not be had. The tenor of the survivor’s response is, instead, suffused - 
both consciously and unconsciously - with themes of incomplete lives and 
mutant deaths. He is terrified by the specter of absurdity and forced 
into what Kierkegaard has called a "belief by virtue of the absurd." 
For most of us, but even more so for the survivor, this belief is 
untenable for it requires a confrontation with primordial images of 
death and nothingness, images we cannot confront and remain psychically 
whole. The only recourse is in the elaboration of an ameliorating 
counter-imagery. In ossence he cannot muster the prerequisite sonse 
of transcendental persistence that is part of the work of mourning. 
Hillel Klein, however,sees the guilt itself as accomplishing, in 
a truncated way, the work of mourning, serving as a means of "identifi¬ 
cation with the destroyed world,-thereby achieving a restitution by 
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identification with lost love objects.” 266 It seems to me that this can 
hardly be tho case. Though guilt does establish a sense of connection 
it is a highly distorted one essentially characterized by a high 
degree of ambivalence toward the dead and the entire mourning process. 
The survivor attempts to mourn via various formal rituals and to estab¬ 
lish a sense of continuity with the lives of tho dead, but at tho same 
time ho tries to rid himself of images of the dead which, though crucial 
for completion of mourning, he perceives as tainted and threatening. 267 
This further heightens his sense of guilt, and rather than being a form 
of mourning this guilt becomes part of a vicious cycle which impairs 
mourning further. 
This cyclo may bo tho perpotual generator for tho chronic survivor 
syndromo with guilt being tho ever-presont fuol. do Wind has noted that 
therapy often consists of breaking this cyclo, that is aiding tho sur- 
vivor in carrying out tho work of mourning. Similarly, tho profound 
and protracted mourning carried out by a survivor for recent deaths 
(oven years after liberation) often reflects tho roomorgonco of a 
heretofore impaired ability to mourn. 
I believe that tho theoretical issues now begin to take form. Tho 
residual images imprinted onto tho psyche of tho survivor attains its 
potency by boing closely linked to fears of death, issues of symbolic 
immortality, and tho sphere of existential guilt. That these themes all 
affect the survivor*s efferts to mourn for and define himsolf in relation¬ 
ship to tho doad is clear. It is a leng circuitous road closely bordered 
by elemental themes ef life and death, guilt and innocence, but I believe 
we can new begin te delineate that end which has became the life ef the 
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survivor. 

CHAPTER V 
TOWARD A THEORY OF SURVIVOR GUILT 
A lie is often an expression of the fear that 
ono may b® crus'nod by the truth. 
- Franz Kafka 
N© peetry after Auschwitz. 
- T.W. Adorno 
Thero seem to be two forms of guilt active in the psyche of the 
survivor - neurotic and ontologic. Neurotic guilt devolves from the 
infantile conflicts which set the pattern for all later guilt feelings. 
Ontologic or existential guilt derives from the vagaries of an uncertain 
existence, coming to the fore with the development of a symbolizing 
apparatus that is capable of integrating the reality of death and a 
sense of symbolic immortality to defend against that reality. Both must 
develop simultaneously in order to spare the psycho a painful and 
terrifying confrontation with the image of one’s own death. Ontologic 
guilt is the cost of human awareness. It is intimately bound up with 
symbols of continuity and connection, becoming manifest only when 
these symbols are threatened with annihilation. To avoid such threats 
the psycho will go to great lengths, it may produce a neurosis or, if 
need be, a psychosis t# divert the mind from focusing on images of death. 
The concentration camp survivor is faced with just such threats to 
his symbolic armor: death and destruction are the residual images of his 
most profound experience. He must confront a total abandonment by the 
95 
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processes of existence. The concentration aamp was a psyc'nohistorical 
vacuum in which the normal flow of time and ovents became disrupted. 
Causality aid not exist. "Only tho hero and now exists* yesterday and 
tomrnorrow ar® both equal and without reality" ^70, ±s the complaint of 
the survivor in the camps. The anonymity ef time, as Bettelheim terms 
it 271, destroyed tho reference from which identity took its origins. 
Edith Jacobson speaks of disturbances of time sense among survivors of 
Extreme Situations.^72 This suggests that tho role of time itself may 
play a more important part than we have recognized. I spoak of time not 
only in the chronological sense, but of the eues and symbols w# derive 
from the sheer flow ef timo in tho individual life. The sense of time, 
linked to and perhaps derived from tho sense of change. is essential 
to provide us with a sense of historical movement and of tho individual's 
place within it. It is this sense of individual historicity garnered from 
the flow ef timo that enables us to live extrahisterically, that is, to 
envision ourselves surviving eur historical time by a symbolic immortal¬ 
ity. Tho loss of time's cues, of a sense of flux, is another burden of 
the survivor for it strands him again in a landscape of the absurd 
accompanied enly by an imagery ef death. 
Another component ef self-definition is the cycle ef generations, 
the natural flew of life and death which provides us with a senso of 
place within historical change. This sense ef place gives us, beyond 
immortality but part of it as woll, a feeling for the immutability of 
our individual lives within a cosmic framework. But immutability requiros 
more than being; it requires being within an immutable natural order. 
When this order is obliterated by what we have called inappropriate or 
( as it might be mere accurately termed when referring to tho profound 
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dislocations of the concen'-ration camp) mutant death, the sense of place, 
of causal connection with history and the universe is radically altered. 
Again it is the absurd which the survivor faces, and this further 
engenders ids fears of loss and dying. 
This fear in turn is phrased in ontologic terms bocause they best 
express our inability t* establish, evon by our own standards of reality, 
not a sense of immortality but immortality itself, to overcome not simply 
fears of death but death itsolf. We have come to phrase our existential 
debilities in terms of personal culpability because in that dimly 
remembered ancient time of eur past when we first encountered a dis¬ 
obedient external world the only causal agent, and hence the only thing 
that could be at fault, was ourselves. 
This is the elemental guilt we are virtually bern with. When we are 
able te cenceptualize doath then death becomes the archctypo for eur 
inability to come te terms with existence and it becomes the focus for 
eur basic guilt. Ordinarily we do not confront it for we arc shielded 
by those symbols which make up our individual and societal mythologies. 
When these mythologies, ordinarily firmly-rooted in the oraerod landscape 
ef our lives, are shattered by annihilation of that natural landscape 
we must either face eur fear and guilt er find other defenses. 
The cencentration oamps wore Just such a time. In an envirenmont 
in which acausality was the rule, mutant death the commenplace, and the 
anonymity of timo the convention, the survivor could in nowiso roly on 
those indicos that ordinarily mark tho pattorn of his oxistonco and aid 
him in orocting tho symbolic framo by which ho might otherwiso protoct 
himsolf. 
Tho eoneontration camp prisoner found himsolf in a situation where 
I 
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a protective symbology was a crucial need but whcro ho could not maintain 
one because all illusions had been shattered by stark realities. The 
images of absurdity, the ineluctable realities that are the end of every 
life, were multiplied many-fold for the survivor within a context of 
unspeakable violence. Rather than availing himself of a sense of sym¬ 
bolic immortality he finds himself in a continuous stato of threatened 
mortality; and whore hope for fulfilled life is tho prerequisite for any 
symbols of immortality coping with prospects of promatur# cessation of 
life impairs any further formulations. 
Tho psycho simply cannot cope with this poltergeist of annihilation. 
Wo know this to b© so from tho normal processes of mourning in which wo 
all confront death but through a series of formal rituals not only cop© 
with it but swiftly place it in a perspective that makes it meaningful. 
Within tho concentration camp those rituals, and thus the anodyne conc¬ 
eption of death, could net be acieved, so the concentration camp survivor 
must wait for a safer time to mourn tho dead. While waiting for the 
opportunity to mourn, however, the survivor must seek seme temporary 
defenses that will enervate the increasingly active and potent death 
imagery. Within the camps it appears that psychio numbing and regression 
are the most common escapes being maintained until some timo after 
liberation. But these mechanisms cannot be used indefinitely because 
of tho powerful death imagery imprinted on the mind of the survivor. 
Thou h tho basic imagery is always present it forces itself into focus 
mere significantly when hope for return of the dead cannot be realisti¬ 
cally held to and the survivor is forced te confrent the facts en very 
real and unequal terms. As he reckons with the deaths of family and 
friends and with harsh reminders of his pewerlessness he must also face 
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th# knowledge that he teo is subject to the cosmic absurdity of events. 
However one cannot remain psycnioally whole and continue facing 
the terror of death for any length of time. It has been suggested that 
schizphrenia may represent one adaptation in cases whore the symbolizing 
apparatus is inadequate to ward off the imagery of death. The ego is loft 
with another, less drastic, choice: it may find a way of diverting its 
focus from these images which are too painful to be sustainrd. It can 
choose rather than a psychotic disengagement from reality a neurotic 
interlude. Psychosis does not seem to be the diversion of choice; it 
appears that there is actually a lower incidence of psychosis among 
concentration camp survivors as compared with ether hospitalized patient 
populations. Neurosis as we knew, manifest by the elements ef the sur¬ 
vivor syndrome, is a very frequent finding among survivors; and survivor 
guilt is the dominant theme of the syndrome. 
It appears that the survivor’s reaction to fear ef the absurd is 
the universal one. We all try to allay our fears by an immersion in a 
primitive ontological guilt which tells us that we are at fault for all 
that occurs. This represents man's earliest attempts to order his universe, 
oven if in a recognizably specious manner, by giving himself a sons© ef 
eentrel ever events. It also serves to remeve the sense ef absurdity by 
implying a merally erdared universe. This vision has at its center the 
meaningfulness of death, and as such it makes death, however it may 
occur, the natural order ef things. For the survivor things are mere 
difficult: having seen the rhythms of life and death interrupted and 
profoundly altered ho is unable to sustain any image of death, be it 
meaningful or otherwise, and since ontic guilt requires some death 
imagery the survivor cannot think entically at all. 
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The first attempt at protection and formulation is a failure, and 
because the perception ©f an ©ntologically circumscribed universe cannot 
be realized th® sens© of symbolic immortality cannot be attained. 
Without the sense of symbolic immortality any attempt at mourning 
that the survivor initiates would fail for as we have said the work of 
mourning requires that this sense be intact. So the death imprint of 
the survivor , and the continual symbolic reactivations of that imprint, 
impairs not only his efforts at denying absurdity but his efforts to 
integrate them by the means ordinarily available. With this tack 
unsuccessful the survivor searches elsewhere for relief.* As the herited 
medes by which he weuld pretect himself prove ef little value he has ne 
choice but to look to the event itself for a way out. 
The event does provide a way, one which can utilize the already- 
formed pattern ef entelegic guilt, as well as a way in which certain 
historical forms may be recapitulated - which allows the survivor net 
only to reinsert himself into a moral universe but to recapture the 
immortality in being an integral part ef a recurrent historical pattern. 
But te look at the event means to look at death, and this is still 
impossible. The event, hewevor, is disjointed, and varying aspects of 
it may bo viewed independently - very unlike the tetalism required by 
the entic vision - thus providing the survivor with a means ef circumvent¬ 
ing the death imagery. The actions ef the survivor are liko thoso of a 
* Any sense of temporal demarcation that may be inferred is a 
linguistic misrepresentation on my part for it appears that all ef 
these psychological perambulations take place virtually simultaneously 
and disarganizedly deep in the survivor's unconscious. 
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microscopist• ho is able t® focus down with a liigh-powered lens of tho 
imagination on a small circumscribed portion which he makes tho central 
pGrcopt of the experience. Tho survivor's doubts about his rolo in the 
Holocaust is an aspect that has always boon present, but now it is 
magnified and made of greater significance than tho more frightening and 
central death imagery. The sot of psychological maneuvers whereby the 
perception of guilt becomes preeminent is abetted by a blurred distinc¬ 
tion between assailant and victim which foments a sense of complicity. 
The sens® of guilt derives frem a subtle step-by-step process with 
multiple variations that leads from absurdity to complicity, from a 
conception of fact to fault, to an equation of thought and act. On three 
levels, individual, communal, and relational,the imagery ef contingency 
gives tho survivor a sense of being an accomplice in his victimization 
rather than simply an unwitting victim. He feels he has had an active 
part in his own demise, and that his worst thoughts became realities 
merely because he harbored them as thoughts. This transmogrification 
of psychohistorieal reality begins with tho death imprint, or tho ultimato 
horror. Simultaneously tho ©ntic pattern sets in, but if it is not to 
fail as a defense it must be reinforced. The first reinforcement is on 
an individual level. In defining his relationship to tho dead the sur¬ 
vivor cannot view thorn critically because to do so would bo to asperse 
the validity and completeness of their lives. For one such as tho sur¬ 
vivor whose held on his own possibilities is so extremely tenuous any 
kind of criticism of the dead can only remind him of tho disintegration 
of his own life-value. Se tho dead are idealized in a move that makes 
death a mode of immortality by its becoming synonymous with fulfillment 
and, hence, an integral part ef the cycle ef generations. Complete lives. 
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in the next step ef this psychic syllogism, are the supremely good ones, 
and those who diod must have be^n good. The nature of the camps supports 
this by negative evidence: there were activities that survivors engaged 
in that wore less than ethical, thus, a. fortiori, the dead whe did net 
benefit from this kind of activity were surely saintly. Survival is 
equated with wrongdoing, and the survivor becomes a guilty party. 
The anemaleusness ef survival helps to reinforce the survivor’s 
sense ef inferierity. Witnessing the deaths ef se many people he 
knew te bo good he must concludo that in not receiving their lot 
he was net. The quintessence ef this imagery is the death ef children 
who, since they are presumed innocent and present the most profound 
problems of survival priority, could not havo suffered on account 
ef any actions of their own. By recourse to an archotypal logacy 
he can view the children as innocent sacrifices in his stead, and 
by enly a small selipsistie oxtensien he can view all the dead in this 
fashion. In many eases the residual imagery ef the event, as I believe 
has been amply shewn, lends itself te this perception, further entrap¬ 
ping the surviver in his feelings ef meral inferiority and guilt. 
A similar dynamic operates on the cemmunal level, where the surviver 
has at hand a historical cernmnity of victims with which he identifies. 
By doing this he rejoins a historical movement and can attempt te 
share in the extrahisterieal immertality ef the cemmunity. Inherent in 
this cemmunal legacy, however, are also another series ef guilt images 
that again place the surviver in a pesition ef responsibility for 
his friends and his nation as a whole. This sense of communal 
intordepondenee in matters of culpability may bo s een as a prime 
example of how we defend against suffering’s irrationality by means 
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•f survivor guilt. 
The relational imagery of the camps, that is the everyday aspects 
of life, contained similar dual imagery ef death and guilt. It is 
connected with aspects of immortality as well as with memories ef 
death and dying, but the whole image is distorted as it is viewed 
theugh a condenser of guilt. 
These images and their variations all serve to disengage, and 
eventually disallow the survivor’s focus on the imagory ef death that 
initially threatened to overwhelm him. The price ho pays is that ef 
an immersien in guilt; by moans of continual solfdoproeation and 
the impossibility of atonement by virtue ef the fact that the objects 
of his guilt are no longer here (er were never here as he perceives 
them) the cycle of chronic guilt is established. 
The only possibility for atonement lies in working through 
mourning with resolution of ambivalent feelings about the dead and 
integration of their memories in a cohesive self-system. The problem, 
though, is that the survivors inability to copo with any images ef 
tho dead continues to impair mourning. In effeot the focus on guilt 
which diverts tho concentration camp survivor from tho imagery of 
death that threatens him also prevents him from dealing with images 
of death that might aid him in reselving tho difficulties of mourning. 
Thus, via the labyrinthine cennoctions between the guilt of mourning 
and the guilt of survival (both of which we may censider medem 
!,refinementsrt of the primitive entic guilt),the result is a paradox¬ 
ical one: by an exclusive focus on the latter form of guilt the 
survivor cannot deal with tho former. In other words, by being 
exclusively concerned with the imagination of complicity in which 

104 
guilt is the focus, a distortion of reality ensues impairing efforts 
to deal with relationships to the dead, especially those that are 
guilt-laden. 
Tnis is where the survivor stands 5 he cannot mourn because 
he cannot confront the dead. He cannot confront the dead for 
to do so means psychic disintegration, so he fixes on a guilt which 
further paralyzes him in various postures of the survivor syndrome. 
The guilt itself may be extremely painful and in a tertiary maneuver 
more amenable (in terms ef psychic econemy) aspects of the surviver 
syndrome may be taken up. This accounts for the frequent difficulty 
in locating elements of guilt on the landscape ef surviver pathology, 
as it becomes further hidden in various other foci of the syndrome. 
The survivor, as I havo suggested at various points along the way, 
contends with a number ef vicious cycles which impair efforts toward 
mastery ef the experience. There are however these who have reported 
cures of the surviver syndrome by breaking these cycles at certain key 
points. Thero is also the heartening reminder ef the many survivors whe 
live nermal lives, never seeming to require the therapist’s aid, or even 
to have any difficulties in dealing with the event. The point, as many 
psychiatrists and social workers agree, is that there seems te be & way 
out ef the survivor’s dilomma. My own clinical experienco is nen-existont 
and the thrust of this papor is entirely theoretical, but on just those 
theoretical grounds I must take a radicaaly pessimistic stance. If the 
dynamic of concentration camp surviver guilt is as I have posited it then 
I see ‘'cure*' as an impossibilty, a totally unimpaired life as unachiev¬ 
able for these survivors. They are permanently marked and scarred by 
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an encounter with death and absurdity that is unparalleled in 
psychological history, and if these survivors feel, as some do, 
that they have been made the bearers of a unique vision I, for one, 
would concur. I have spoken of thoir confrontation with mutant 
death, but we ought to remember that it is mutant only by 
definition of the psychological defenses we have erected around the 
actuality of death. In existential actuality mutation simply 
does not exist, for life as it is lived (not perceived) is absurd, 
and since time immemorial man has spent effort trying to deny this 
by a host of defenses that can be categorized as a sense of ©ntelegical 
connectedness. Symbolic immortality and tho many transcendental 
modes ef achieving it are the major part ef this attempt to deny 
absurdity, and for most of us the denial is achieved,, 
Sven as I write that we live an absurd existonce where death is 
the only inevitable erder ef things I do not accept it. True I 
believe it, but only in a distant, farfetched, highly intellectualized 
way; my viscera de net give any indication of bolief. When we see 
another die we cateh a glimpse ef the truth, but even then we are 
protected from actuality by all the symbols we can muster to make 
it a meaningful event that is net really an end. We have no sense 
of an ending for even nothingness is given consolations. 
But the survivor knows bettor. Ho has seen actuality as reality. 
He has lived with and by absurdity, net in the blur ef a mushroom 
cloud or the flash ef a flood, but as a d?ily routine in which 
absurdity could net be consigned to such intellectable denominators 
as "technology” or "nature." For the concentration camp survivor 
absurdity and death were entirely within a human frame. It was carried 
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out by and inflicted upon human beings in a facc-to-face moment. For 
the concentration camp survivor there can be no rationalizing away of 
death, no philosophical elevation to seme higher order of events - they 
breatneo oeath in quotidian extremity. The absurd universe was part of 
their existence, and beneath the neurotic defenses they erect it remains 
such. 
To put it very simply: survivors know death. For the surviver as 
for no eno else this is a truth that cannet be adequately defended against 
by the usual means. Se for these who would say that they can cure the 
surviver I woulci urge them to be wary. To remove the neurotic adaptations 
of the survivor may be to force him to look at a truth that he knows, 
one that could destroy his psychic integrity. The surviver must live 
an impaired life for net to do so would mean he could have no life at 
all. Perhaps the cycle of guilt can be broken in ways that will make 
it less severe, but again, to remove the impairment may be to remove 
the only defense. 
I oan only hope that the lack of clinical experience has distorted 
my purview of the situation. Perhaps I have net yet achieved a knowledge 
of the resiliency of the human spirit that can only be gained beyond the 
realm of idea and theory. If this is se, and my theoretical eenelusiens 
are mistaken, no error would be mere welcome. 
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